The Global Risks Forum (GRF)
Public and private actors cooperate on capital through partnerships, guarantees, blended finance, co-investment and sponsorship of public programmes. Each arrangement shares risk and reward, and each can move costs onto the public balance sheet or weaken accountability if safeguards are missing. This page sets out the principles that govern cooperation, the fiscal and integrity risks it creates, and the evidence that ministries, regulators and boards use to manage them.
GRF · Established · service level R0
Public-private partnerships are long-term contracts in which a private party provides a public asset or service and bears significant risk, paid by users or the government. With guarantees, blended finance and co-investment they share risk and reward, and can move costs back onto the public balance sheet or weaken accountability without safeguards.
Where people live and how far each division sits from a large city's services, shown for Middle East and North Africa as an example geography for this subject.
Safeguards for sponsorship and support. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Partnership contracts transfer some risks to private parties, but guarantees, minimum revenue clauses and renegotiation can return them to the state. The fiscal cost often appears years after signature.
Blended finance uses public money to improve the risk or return for private investors. Without a clear case for additionality and minimum concessionality, subsidy can exceed what the public purpose requires.
Unsolicited proposals, direct negotiation and sponsorship arrangements create room for conflicts of interest and capture. Competitive procedure, disclosure and independent review limit that room.
When delivery passes to a private party, citizens and parliaments lose line of sight. Contract publication, performance reporting and grievance channels keep public accountability intact.
Each term as this page uses it. Where a standard-setting body defines the term, the wording follows that body.
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Blended finance | The use of concessional public or philanthropic funds to mobilise private investment. |
| Additionality | Whether public support enables investment that would not otherwise have happened. |
| Unsolicited proposal | A project proposed by a private party without a government request, which raises competition risks. |
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Partnership contracts published | percent of signed contracts | annual | Treasury PPP unit records, open contracting portals | REPORTED |
| Direct and contingent liabilities from partnerships | percent of GDP | annual | Fiscal risk statement, PFRAM-based estimates | ESTIMATED |
| Contracts renegotiated | count and share of active contracts | annual | PPP unit records | REPORTED |
| Private finance mobilised by official interventions | US dollars | annual | OECD DAC mobilisation statistics | REPORTED |
| Guarantees outstanding | national currency | annual | Debt office guarantee registers | OFFICIAL |
| Unsolicited proposals accepted without competition | count | annual | PPP unit and procurement records | REPORTED |
| Private participation in infrastructure commitments | US dollars | annual | World Bank PPI Database | REPORTED |
The topic as a computational graph: named sources feed the methods, an evidence review gates the outputs, and the decisions stay with the authorities that hold them.
Fig. 02Nodes carry their type, two metric rows and a state; connectors show what feeds what; dashed frames name the owners; the timeline is the cadence. Design of the pipeline, not a record of a run.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Source | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database | Infrastructure projects with private participation by country, sector and type | CC BY 4.0 |
| OECD DAC statistics on private finance mobilised | Amounts mobilised by official development finance interventions | CC BY 4.0 |
| IMF and World Bank PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Model documentation | Method for estimating fiscal costs and risks of partnership projects | Free, IMF copyright and usage terms |
| World Bank Benchmarking Infrastructure Development | Regulatory quality of PPP preparation, procurement and management | CC BY 4.0 |
| National PPP unit registers and open contracting portals | Contracts, amendments, payments and performance | Open, licence per publisher |
| Debt office guarantee registers | Guarantees issued, beneficiaries and calls | Public records, terms per government |
Capital Nexus prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Who decides | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Finance ministries and PPP units | Whether a project should proceed as a partnership and what fiscal exposure it creates | Value-for-money methods, PFRAM-type exposure estimates and comparator contracts |
| Debt management offices | Whether to issue a guarantee, on what terms and with what reporting | Guarantee registers, call histories and contingent liability limits |
| Parliaments and audit institutions | Whether partnership commitments and renegotiations are authorised and disclosed | Contract publication, renegotiation records and fiscal risk statements |
| Boards of development finance institutions | Whether blended finance meets additionality and minimum concessionality standards | Blended finance principles, project-level justification and evaluation |
Resources, data, expertise and legitimacy, and the interests behind them.
Capture of agendas, privileged access, conflicts of interest and reputational transfer.
Disclosure, separation of funding from content, and clear rules on access and use of names.
How safeguards are monitored and breaches handled.
Sponsorship can shape agendas without explicit control. Topics, speakers and framing may drift toward sponsors' interests unless rules separate funding from content.
Access is a currency. Proximity to officials and regulators can give sponsors informational or influence advantages. Rules that prevent privileged access protect both public institutions and other firms.
Implied endorsement transfers reputation. Logos and joint branding can suggest that a public institution approves a company or product.
Competition law applies when competitors meet. Discussions among firms in the same market must avoid sharing commercially sensitive information.
Cooperation can also be done well. Clear purpose, published terms, independent review of content and a public record of who contributed what allow private knowledge and resources to serve public goals without blurring accountability.
| Method or data | What it shows | Its limit |
|---|---|---|
| Disclosure registers | Who funds and supports what | Show relationships, not influence |
| Conflict-of-interest declarations | Personal and institutional interests | Depend on honest declaration |
| Agenda and record review | Whether content tracks sponsor interests | Requires independent reviewers |
| Comparative policy review | Safeguards in other institutions | Practices vary widely |
The current service level is R0: information and enquiries. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.