R-P02 · TOPIC · crisis-communicationsGRF dossier · service level R0
GRFDisaster and Crisis GovernanceIn development
Topic dossier · Disaster and Crisis Governance

Crisis communications

In a crisis people need to know what is happening, what to do and whom to trust, often before the facts are clear. Crisis communication is a governance function: it needs a mandate, coordination between agencies, accessible formats and a way to correct rumours. This page sets out how crisis communication holds or fails, the records that show it, and the office holders who decide what is said, by whom and when.

Systems · around this subjectDesign, not a record

Multi-agency coordination board

Crisis communications · National crisis centre · Exercise EX-67

Coordination exerciseGRF · Disaster and Crisis Governance

Who leads what

WarningMeteorological serviceCivil protectionClearActive
EvacuationMunicipalityPoliceOverlapTasked
ShelterSocial servicesVolunteer societyClearActive
Public informationCrisis coordinatorAllGapUnassigned

Exercise log

  1. 09:00STAExercise start
  2. 09:26WRNRed warning issued
  3. 10:37GAPTwo agencies issue conflicting advice
  4. 11:00FIXSingle spokesperson named

After-action items

  1. AA-1Assign public information lead in lawPolicy owner74 d
  2. AA-2Shared situation picture between agenciesCrisis centre71 d
Multi-agency coordination board: the screen's structure, terms and states for Crisis communications.Placeholder names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.

Fig.Multi-agency coordination board. Design wireframe with placeholder names and illustrative values, not a record or a live system.

01In brief

The short answer.

Crisis communication is the public information function of a crisis response: telling people what is happening, what to do and when updates will come. It needs a mandate, coordinated messages, accessible formats and prompt correction of rumours. Government communication offices and emergency agencies hold the decisions.

02Geography

Hazards now in the Caribbean.

For crisis communications, in GRF's situational-awareness reading, the map opens on population density, flood water and active fires with clouds now from NASA GIBS, framed on the Caribbean; 3 further NASA layers wait in the list.

The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.

Layers 3

Hazards now, for this page

Latest available

NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth

Loading the latest NASA imagery.

Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.

For crisis communications, in GRF's situational-awareness reading, the map opens on population density, flood water and active fires with clouds now from NASA GIBS, framed on the Caribbean; 3 further NASA layers wait in the list.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date; indicators, not assessments of any place; claim ceiling INTEGRATED.

Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · GDACS · NOAA GOES-East ABI GeoColorSources and licences

  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). CC BY 4.0
  • VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), VIIRS 375 m active fire product, NASA LANCE; vector tiles via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Made with Natural Earth. Free vector and raster map data @ naturalearthdata.com. Public domain
  • © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). ODbL
  • Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Context on the globe and flat map: coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names from NASA GIBS reference layers (OpenStreetMap data, ODbL, © OpenStreetMap contributors); Blue Marble imagery as an optional base; 3D terrain and the elevation read-out from the ASTER GDEM elevation colour index (5 m to 200 m classes, exaggerated for legibility). Boundaries are drawn as published and imply no position on any territory.
  • Globe: MapLibre GL JS 6.9.1, BSD-3-Clause, © MapLibre contributors.
  • Live: NASA EONET Events are indicative, not official warnings.
  • Live: GDACS (EC JRC / UN OCHA) Events are indicative, not official warnings.
  • Live: NOAA GOES-East ABI GeoColor (CIRA). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • Optional layers (21 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.

Layers and dates

  • Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
  • Flood water, 3-day composite: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Oct 2026
  • Active fires and thermal anomalies, last day: VIIRS NOAA-20 375 m (FIRMS), NASA LANCE FIRMS · 13 Oct 2026
  • Night-time lights, daily: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Oct 2026
  • True colour: VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
  • Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024

03The question

Crisis communications: how the risk develops.

Public trust and accessible information. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

Uncertainty must be spoken

Authorities that wait for certainty leave space for rumour; those that speak too confidently lose trust when facts change. Stating what is known, what is not and when the next update comes keeps credibility.

Mechanism

Many voices, one message

Agencies, ministers, local officials and experts speak at once. Without coordination of key messages, contradictions confuse the public and slow protective action.

Mechanism

Reach depends on access

Messages in one language, on one channel or without accessible formats miss people with disabilities, migrants, older people and those offline.

Mechanism

Rumours travel faster

False claims spread through social media and messaging apps faster than official updates. Monitoring and prompt, plain corrections limit their reach.

04Key terms

Terms used on this page.

Each term as this page uses it. Where a standard-setting body defines the term, the wording follows that body.

TermDefinition
Risk communicationThe exchange of information and advice between experts, authorities and people facing a threat so they can protect themselves.
Key messagesAgreed core statements that all spokespeople use so that the public hears consistent information.
InfodemicAn overabundance of information, accurate or not, during an emergency, as WHO uses the term.
05Indicators

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Designated crisis communication lead in plansyes or no, by levelon reviewEmergency plansDECLARED
Languages and accessible formats used in public messagescountper eventPublic message archivesOBSERVED
Time to first official public statementhours from event onsetper eventMessage archivesOBSERVED
Public trust in government information during crisesshare of respondentsperiodicPublic surveysESTIMATED
Corrections issued to false claimscountper eventAgency recordsREPORTED
Communication issues in after-action reportscount by categoryper reviewAfter-action reportsREPORTED
06Canvas

From sources to decisions.

The topic as a computational graph: named sources feed the methods, an evidence review gates the outputs, and the decisions stay with the authorities that hold them.

Pipeline canvas · Crisis communications as a run graphDesign, not a record
Crisis communications: flood forecasting and warning chainRainfall forecasts drive a hydrological then a hydraulic model; inundation maps are compared with thresholds; the mandated authority issues the warning, it reaches people through every channel, and action follows. Design of the process, not a record of a run.

Fig. 02Nodes carry their type, two metric rows and a state; connectors show what feeds what; dashed frames name the owners; the timeline is the cadence. Design of the pipeline, not a record of a run.

07Sources

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

SourceWhat it givesLicence class
WHO risk communication and community engagement guidancePrinciples and practice for public health emergency communicationFree, WHO terms
OECD Trust SurveyPublic trust in government institutions across member countriesFree, OECD terms
Official message archives and press releasesWhat authorities said and whenPublic records, terms per publisher
After-action and inquiry reportsReviews of communication in past crisesPublic records, terms per publisher
Reuters Institute Digital News ReportHow people access news, including in crisesFree to read, terms to check
08Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Disaster and Crisis Governance prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Government communication officesWho speaks, how messages are coordinated and how often updates comeComparative mandates and after-action lessons
Emergency management and health agenciesWhat protective actions to advise and how to explain uncertaintyCommunication guidance and records of past events
Public service broadcastersHow to carry official information and correct false claimsBroadcast obligations and practice
Disability and community organizationsHow messages reach people who are often missedAccessibility practice and evidence from past crises

Outputs this topic produces

  • Comparative notes on crisis communication mandates and coordination
  • Guide to communicating uncertainty in emergencies
  • Dialogue briefs on accessible and multilingual public information
  • Questions for agencies preparing communication plans
09Core questions

What governance experts ask.

In a crisis, people make life-and-death decisions based on what they hear. Clear, timely, consistent and accessible information helps them act; conflicting or delayed messages cause confusion and erode trust. Trust built in normal times is the main asset in a crisis, and it can be lost quickly through secrecy, contradiction or perceived unfairness.

  • Who speaks for whom in a crisis, and how are messages coordinated across agencies and levels of government?
  • Do messages reach everyone, including people with disabilities, speakers of minority languages and people without internet access?
  • How do authorities communicate uncertainty honestly without causing panic or complacency?
  • How are rumours and false information identified and addressed without undermining legitimate debate?
10Mechanisms

How the arrangements work.

Effective crisis communication depends on credibility, coordination and accessibility.

Credibility

Trusted sources

People act on information from sources they trust, which may be local leaders, community organizations or familiar media rather than national authorities.

Coordination

One message, many voices

Agencies agree messages and spokespeople so that the public hears consistent guidance through many channels.

Accessibility

Reaching everyone

Plain language, multiple languages, sign language, captioning and offline channels reach people that standard messages miss.

Crisis communication research emphasizes that communication is two-way. Authorities that listen to what people are worried about, and to what they are hearing from others, can address concerns before they harden into distrust. Feedback channels, community liaison and monitoring of public questions are therefore part of the communication system, not optional extras.

11Methods and evidence

How the evidence is built, and its limits.

  1. 01

    Message testing

    Testing messages with diverse audiences before crises. Results depend on context and may not hold under stress.

  2. 02

    Audience research

    Surveys and studies of trust and information sources across communities.

  3. 03

    Media and social media analysis

    Monitoring of how messages and rumours spread. Platform data access is uneven.

  4. 04

    Post-crisis review

    Assessment of how communication worked and how the public responded.

12Methods

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Policy, institutional and decision scienceComparing emergency law · Tracing recurring findings · Mapping coordination structuresApplied here
  2. Decision analysis under uncertaintyWarning thresholds and false alarms · Pre-agreed triggers for actionApplied here
  3. Optimization and operations researchPre-positioning relief stocks · Evacuation and relief routing · Sequencing recovery investmentApplied here
13Questions

Questions and answers.

What is risk communication?
The exchange of information, advice and opinions between experts, authorities and people facing a threat, so they can take informed decisions to protect themselves. WHO links it with community engagement.
Should authorities speak before they know the facts?
Guidance generally favours early, honest communication that states what is known, what is not and when more will follow, over silence that leaves space for rumour.
Who corrects false claims in a crisis?
Usually the authority responsible for the subject, with broadcasters, platforms and fact-checkers. Arrangements differ by country and legal framework.
Should authorities communicate uncertainty?
Research suggests that honest communication of uncertainty, with clear guidance on what to do, maintains trust better than false certainty that later proves wrong.
How should rumours be handled?
By providing accurate information quickly through trusted channels, acknowledging concerns and correcting errors, while avoiding measures that suppress legitimate questions.
Does the platform communicate with the public during crises?
No. Nexus is not an emergency service. In an emergency, follow the instructions of your local authorities and emergency services.
Why involve community organizations?
Because they are often more trusted than authorities and can reach people that official channels miss.
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