GRF · Disaster and Crisis Governance
Business continuity governance
When a disaster strikes, hospitals, utilities, banks, ports and ministries must keep their essential services running. Business continuity governance decides which services are essential, how long they may be interrupted and who answers if they fail. ISO 22301 and sector rules on operational resilience set the frame. This page sets out how continuity governance works and fails, the records that show it, and who holds the decisions.
Business continuity governance in seven parts.
- 01The questionBusiness continuity governance: how the risk develops
- 02IndicatorsWhat is measured, and how well
- 03SourcesWhere the evidence comes from
- 04DecisionsWho decides, and what the evidence serves
- 05Core questionsWhat governance experts ask
- 06MechanismsHow the arrangements work
- 07Methods and evidenceHow the evidence is built, and its limits
Business continuity governance: how the risk develops.
Operator and public coordination. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Essential services are defined
Continuity starts by identifying the services whose interruption would cause harm, and setting tolerances for how long and how much disruption is acceptable. Without that, plans protect systems rather than outcomes.
Dependencies hide single points
Services rely on power, telecom, suppliers and staff who may all be affected by the same event. Plans that ignore shared dependencies fail when the backup shares the same weak point.
Boards own continuity
Continuity is a governing body responsibility. Where it sits only with an operational team, investment decisions do not reflect tolerances and gaps surface in an event.
Plans decay untested
Staff change, systems are replaced and suppliers shift. Plans that are not exercised against severe, plausible scenarios lose accuracy without anyone noticing.
People and hazards in the Caribbean.
Population density, night lights and flood water over the Caribbean, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.
Ramani shirikishi inahitaji JavaScript. Orodha ya tabaka na vyanzo imetolewa hapa chini.
Tabaka 3
People and hazards, for this page
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Imekadiriwa
- Chanzo
- Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Chuo Kikuu cha Columbia))
- Mtoaji
- NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Chuo Kikuu cha Columbia)
- Leseni
- CC BY 4.0
- Tarehe ya data
- null; Makadirio yanayotokana na sensa, isiyobadilika (2020)
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban kilomita 1
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Makadirio yanayotokana na sensa ya watu kwa kila kilomita ya mraba mwaka 2020, yanayoonyeshwa kama muktadha wa mfiduo; si hesabu ya watu walioathiriwa na janga lolote.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Imeonekana
- Chanzo
- VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2) (NASA LAADS DAAC)
- Mtoaji
- NASA LAADS DAAC
- Leseni
- Data huria ya NASA
- Tarehe ya data
- kila siku; Mng'ao wa setilaiti, uliorekebishwa kwa mwanga wa mwezi na angahewa
- Ya hivi karibuni wakati wa ujenzi
- 2026-10-12
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban mita 500
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Mng'ao wa usiku kutoka setilaiti kwa tarehe iliyoonyeshwa; taa ni kiashiria cha matumizi na kukatika kwa umeme, si kipimo cha usambazaji au upatikanaji.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Imeonekana (mawingu huacha mapengo)
- Chanzo
- Bidhaa ya Mafuriko ya Kimataifa ya VIIRS (NASA LANCE)
- Mtoaji
- NASA LANCE
- Leseni
- Data huria ya NASA
- Tarehe ya data
- kila siku; Ugunduzi wa setilaiti; mawingu huacha mapengo
- Ya hivi karibuni wakati wa ujenzi
- 2026-10-14
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban mita 250
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Ugunduzi wa setilaiti; mawingu huacha mapengo. Raster ya setilaiti au modeli kama mtoaji anavyoichapisha. Mawingu, mapengo ya mkondo wa setilaiti na makosa ya upimaji huacha mapengo na kelele; thamani ni viashiria, si vipimo mahali fulani.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Imeonekana (mawingu na muda wa kupita kwa setilaiti huacha mapengo)
- Chanzo
- VIIRS NOAA-20 mita 375 (FIRMS) (NASA LANCE FIRMS)
- Mtoaji
- NASA LANCE FIRMS
- Leseni
- Data huria ya NASA
- Tarehe ya data
- kila siku; Ugunduzi wa setilaiti; mawingu na muda wa kupita kwa setilaiti huacha mapengo
- Ya hivi karibuni wakati wa ujenzi
- 2026-10-13
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban mita 500
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Ugunduzi wa setilaiti wa maeneo ya joto kwa siku iliyoonyeshwa, ikiwemo miale ya gesi na joto la viwandani; si moto uliothibitishwa, ripoti ya tukio au onyo.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Imeonekana
- Chanzo
- Mwangaza uliorekebishwa wa VIIRS NOAA-20 (NASA LANCE)
- Mtoaji
- NASA LANCE
- Leseni
- Data huria ya NASA
- Tarehe ya data
- kila siku; Picha ya satelaiti
- Ya hivi karibuni wakati wa ujenzi
- 2026-10-14
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban mita 250
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Picha ya satelaiti. Raster ya satelaiti au ya muundo kama mtoa huduma anavyoichapisha. Mawingu, mapengo ya ukanda na makosa ya upatikanaji huacha mapengo na kelele; thamani ni viashiria, si vipimo mahali fulani.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Modelled (latest year GIBS publishes)
- Chanzo
- MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1) (NASA LP DAAC)
- Mtoaji
- NASA LP DAAC
- Leseni
- Data huria ya NASA
- Tarehe ya data
- yearly; Satellite classification; latest year GIBS publishes
- Ya hivi karibuni wakati wa ujenzi
- 2024-01-01
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban mita 500
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Satellite land cover classes for the year shown, including croplands; a classification with known errors, not a farm register.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kibodi, ramani ikiwa imelengwa
Shikilia Ctrl au ⌘ na usogeze ili kukuza
Ya karibuni zaidi inayopatikana
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © wachangiaji wa OpenStreetMap (ODbL) · Natural Earth
Inapakia picha za hivi karibuni za NASA.
Buruta ili kusogeza. Ctrl au ⌘ na usogeze, bana au tumia vitufe ili kukuza; elea juu ili kuona thamani zilizo chini ya kiashiria; weka upya hurudisha kwenye eneo.
People and hazards, framed on the Caribbean.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.
Takwimu: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © wachangiaji wa OpenStreetMap · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · Utafiti wa Jiolojia wa MarekaniVyanzo na leseni
- We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
- VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), VIIRS 375 m active fire product, NASA LANCE; vector tiles via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). Cite as: NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA open data
- Imetengenezwa kwa Natural Earth. Data huria za ramani za vekta na rasta @ naturalearthdata.com. Kikoa cha umma
- © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). ODbL
- Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- Muktadha kwenye tufe na ramani bapa: mwambao, mipaka, barabara na majina ya mahali kutoka tabaka za marejeo za NASA GIBS (data ya OpenStreetMap, ODbL, © wachangiaji wa OpenStreetMap); picha za Blue Marble kama msingi wa hiari; ardhi ya 3D na usomaji wa mwinuko kutoka faharasa ya rangi ya mwinuko ya ASTER GDEM (madaraja ya 5 m hadi 200 m, yaliyokuzwa ili yasomeke). Mipaka imechorwa kama ilivyochapishwa na haimaanishi msimamo wowote kuhusu eneo lolote.
- Matukio ya moja kwa moja: NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker (EONET); matukio ni ya kuashiria tu na yanabaki na viungo vya vyanzo vyao asili.
- Moja kwa moja: NASA EONET. Matukio ni ya kuashiria tu, si tahadhari rasmi za mamlaka.
- Moja kwa moja: U.S. Geological Survey. Matukio ni ya kuashiria tu, si tahadhari rasmi za mamlaka.
- NASA GIBS: Tunatambua matumizi ya picha zinazotolewa na huduma za Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS) za NASA, sehemu ya Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS) ya NASA.
- Optional layers (5 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.
Tabaka na tarehe
- Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
- Taa za usiku, kila siku: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Okt 2026
- Maji ya mafuriko, mchanganyiko wa siku 3: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Okt 2026
- Moto unaowaka na hitilafu za joto: VIIRS NOAA-20 375 m (FIRMS), NASA LANCE FIRMS · 13 Okt 2026
- Rangi halisi: VIIRS NOAA-20 mng'ao uliosahihishwa, NASA LANCE · 13 Okt 2026
- Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ISO 22301 certificates issued | count | annual | ISO Survey of certifications | IMERIPOTIWA |
| Essential services with set impact tolerances | share of identified services | annual | Self-assessments | DECLARED |
| Continuity exercises against severe scenarios | count per year | annual | Exercise records | DECLARED |
| Recovery time achieved against target | hours | per incident and per test | Incident and test records | IMEONEKANA |
| Critical suppliers with continuity assurance | share of critical suppliers | annual | Supplier management records | DECLARED |
| Public service interruptions after disasters | service hours lost | per event | Regulator and operator reports | IMERIPOTIWA |
Multi-agency coordination board.
The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Multi-agency coordination board
Business continuity governance · National crisis centre · Exercise EX-98
Who leads what
| Warning | Meteorological service | Civil protection | Wazi | Active |
| Evacuation | Municipality | Police | Overlap | Tasked |
| Shelter | Social services | Volunteer society | Wazi | Active |
| Public information | Crisis coordinator | Zote | Pengo | Unassigned |
Exercise log
- 09:00STAExercise start
- 09:31WRNRed warning issued
- 10:48GAPTwo agencies issue conflicting advice
- 11:00FIXSingle spokesperson named
After-action items
- AA-1Assign public information lead in lawPolicy owner67 d
- AA-2Shared situation picture between agenciesCrisis centre45 d
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Chanzo | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| ISO Survey of management system standard certifications | Counts of certifications by standard and country | Free to read, ISO terms |
| Basel Committee Principles for Operational Resilience | Expectations for banks’ operational resilience and continuity | Free, BIS terms |
| Sector regulator operational resilience rules and reports | Requirements and supervisory findings for regulated sectors | Public records, terms per regulator |
| Business Continuity Institute research | Surveys of continuity practice and incidents | Free to read with registration, terms to check |
| Utility and telecom outage reports | Recorded service interruptions and causes | Public records, terms per regulator |
Compare instruments: rules, incentives and information.
Three families of instruments side by side against the baseline, each with its own lag and adoption speed, under the coverage and compliance you set; effect sizes are teaching values to replace with evidence. Scenario: named assumptions about the future, not a forecast. The map on this page shows The Caribbean; the model itself is not tied to a place.
Controls
- Baseline trend of the outcome
- 2.0% a year
- Coverage of the instrument
- 70%
- Uzingatiaji wa kanuni
- 75%
- Effect size, against the teaching value
- 100%
- Years ahead
- 20 years
Readouts
- Largest reduction at the horizon
- Regulation
- Its reduction against the baseline
- 21%
Numbers, methods and sources
| Year | Hali ya msingi | Regulation | Economic incentive | Information and capacity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 100.0 | 99.5 | 98.8 | 99.1 |
| 1 | 102.0 | 101.2 | 100.1 | 99.8 |
| 2 | 104.0 | 102.5 | 101.1 | 99.9 |
| 3 | 106.1 | 103.5 | 101.6 | 100.0 |
| 4 | 108.2 | 103.7 | 101.8 | 100.7 |
| 5 | 110.4 | 103.2 | 101.7 | 102.1 |
| 6 | 112.6 | 102.0 | 101.6 | 103.9 |
| 7 | 114.9 | 100.4 | 101.6 | 105.9 |
| 8 | 117.2 | 99.2 | 102.1 | 108.0 |
| 9 | 119.5 | 98.6 | 102.9 | 110.1 |
| 10 | 121.9 | 98.9 | 104.2 | 112.3 |
| 11 | 124.3 | 99.7 | 105.7 | 114.5 |
| 12 | 126.8 | 101.1 | 107.4 | 116.8 |
| 13 | 129.4 | 102.7 | 109.4 | 119.2 |
| 14 | 131.9 | 104.5 | 111.4 | 121.6 |
| 15 | 134.6 | 106.5 | 113.5 | 124.0 |
| 16 | 137.3 | 108.5 | 115.7 | 126.5 |
| 17 | 140.0 | 110.7 | 118.0 | 129.0 |
| 18 | 142.8 | 112.9 | 120.4 | 131.6 |
| 19 | 145.7 | 115.1 | 122.8 | 134.2 |
| 20 | 148.6 | 117.4 | 125.2 | 136.9 |
Mbinu
- Tools of government Hood (1983), The Tools of Government, Macmillan
- Carrots, sticks and sermons Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (1998), Transaction
- Diffusion of innovations Rogers (2003), Diffusion of Innovations, Free Press
- Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
- One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Data
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page’s map can draw:
- Borders Natural Earth
- Cities Natural Earth
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in Disaster and Crisis Governance in Foundry
- Tested at Disaster and Crisis Governance in Universe
- Codified in Hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction in Standards
- Published in Disaster and Crisis Governance in Reports
- Taught in Faculty of Hazards, Disasters and Resilience in Academy
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Disaster and Crisis Governance prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Nani anaamua | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Boards and accounting officers | Which services are essential and what disruption is tolerable | Service mapping practice and comparable tolerances |
| Sector regulators | What continuity and resilience obligations apply | Comparative rules and supervisory findings |
| Civil protection authorities | How essential service operators are included in emergency plans | Dependency maps and exercise records |
| Procurement and supplier managers | Which suppliers need continuity assurance | Supplier criticality and assurance practice |
Outputs this topic produces
- Guide to impact tolerances and how they differ from recovery time objectives
- Comparative notes on continuity rules across sectors
- Dialogue briefs on shared dependencies between essential services
- Questions for boards on continuity oversight
From mandate to evaluation, by pillar.
The steps an instrument takes from mandate to evaluation, each with the pillar that runs it, and the decisions that stay with the authority. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows The Caribbean; the model itself is not tied to a place.
- Mandate and problem framing Competent authority (outside the programme)
A competent authority frames the problem and the mandate under its own rules. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) - Evidence and system model Foundry
The system is modelled with its feedbacks, data and stated limits. OECD (2014), principle 2 - Options appraised with scenarios Foundry
Instruments are compared under scenarios, with uncertainty shown. Hood (1983) - Exercise with stakeholders Universe
The options are tested in an exercise with those who would implement and bear them. OECD (2014), principle 3 - Standard or guidance drafted Nexus Standards
What works is codified as a standard or guidance, open to comment. Nexus Standards process - Decision by the authority Competent authority (outside the programme)
The authority decides, outside the programme, with the evidence on record. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) - Capacity and training Risk Academy
Those who implement are trained on the decided instrument and its data. Sendai Framework (2015), priority 2 - Monitoring and public report Reports
Indicators are published with sources, limits and corrections. OECD (2014), principle 5 - Evaluation and revision Nexus Standards
Results return to the standard and the model: the cycle closes. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009)
Mbinu
- Policy cycle Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009), Studying Public Policy, Oxford University Press
- Governance of critical risks OECD (2014), Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Critical Risks
- Layered drawing of directed graphs Sugiyama, Tagawa and Toda (1981), IEEE SMC 11
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in Disaster and Crisis Governance in Foundry
- Tested at Disaster and Crisis Governance in Universe
- Codified in Hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction in Standards
- Published in Disaster and Crisis Governance in Reports
- Taught in Faculty of Hazards, Disasters and Resilience in Academy
What governance experts ask.
When a disaster strikes, people need power, water, telecommunications, fuel, food, payments and health care. The organisations that provide these services must keep operating while their own staff, sites and suppliers are affected. Their continuity plans, and the way those plans fit with public priorities, often decide how long a community goes without essential services.
- Which functions must continue in a crisis, at what minimum level, and what do they depend on?
- How do operators’ continuity plans align with public emergency plans and priorities for restoration?
- How are dependencies between operators, such as telecommunications needing power, managed jointly?
- What obligations do regulators place on operators, and how is compliance tested?
Exercise a cascade in business continuity governance with the people who decide.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Business continuity and resilience: the hazards it names, the systems and communities that carry the loss, the controls and institutions that dampen it and the data that observe it. Pick an initiating event and step through the cascade to see where mandates meet and which decisions fall to whom. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every weight is a stated assumption. An exercise for dialogue, not a forecast, an assessment or a position. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
Majanga
- Dam failure
- River flood (set off downstream)
- Flash flood (set off downstream)
- Mass displacement (set off downstream)
- Widespread power outage (set off downstream)
- Water supply shortfall (set off downstream)
Systems and couplings
Controls
NS-0Katiba na kanuniNS-9UNI za kimuktadha (utekelezaji, matukio, matukio ya programu)NS-10Sera na vifungu (wajibu unaosomeka na mashine: ufafanuzi, ufungamanishaji, tathmini na utekelezaji)NS-11Uthibitishaji na ufuatiliaji (ushahidi, uthibitisho, uchunguzi wa ulinganifu usio na imani)NRS-K36Wasifu wa kifurushi cha nyanja: Miundombinu muhimu (DOMAIN-036)NRS-H107Familia ya majanga: Mkusanyiko na ufanano wa miundombinu ya kidijitali (NHS-1 tech.digital-concentration)NRS-H120Familia ya majanga: Udhaifu wa kimuundo wa mifumo iliyounganishwa (NHS-1 sys.fragility)NRS-X8Ustahimilivu wa kiutendaji na mwendelezo wa biasharaNRS-H56Familia ya majanga: Madhara yanayosababishwa na migogoro (NHS-1 soc.conflict-induced)NRS-H61Familia ya majanga: Kushindwa kwa mfululizo (NHS-1 sys.cascade)
Observation
- NASA Black Marble night-time lights (VNP46) (listed for reference)
- OpenStreetMap planet and replication (listed for reference)
- Number of disruptions to basic services attributed to disasters
Example geography
- Europe: 113 hexagonal cells
- Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
- Surface water through cloud, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 radar), NASA GIBS
- Rain rate, last half hour (IMERG), NASA GIBS
- Surface soil moisture (SMAP), NASA GIBS
How the arrangements work.
Continuity governance links internal planning, sector obligations and public coordination.
Continuity management
Business impact analysis, continuity strategies and plans for loss of staff, sites, systems and suppliers.
Regulatory obligations
Many sectors require operators of essential services to plan for continuity and report incidents. Requirements and enforcement vary.
Coordination with authorities
Arrangements for information sharing, priority restoration, fuel and access during emergencies.
Information sharing between operators and authorities is often the weakest link. Operators may be reluctant to share vulnerabilities for commercial or security reasons, while authorities may lack the expertise to use what is shared. Trusted forums with clear rules on confidentiality, and joint exercises that build relationships, are common ways to overcome this.
Why now: resilience duties increasingly fall on operators directly, for example under the European Union’s rules on critical entities (2022), while continuity plans still assume that other services keep running. The platform is designed to convene operators and authorities on shared dependencies and test continuity arrangements together.
How business continuity governance is governed: instruments, mandates and commitments.
The instruments, mandates, actors and accountability arrangements a policymaker, diplomat or development agency works with, citing the agreements that set them. Structures follow the frameworks named. Any state or progress drawn is illustrative, not a record.
Mandates and agreements over time
The agreements that set mandates and commitments on business continuity governance, from adoption to their current horizon.
- 2015Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk ReductionUNDRR
- 20152030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development GoalsUnited Nations
- 2030Horizon of the 2030 Agenda and the Sendai FrameworkUnited Nations
How the evidence is built, and its limits.
- 01
Continuity plan review
Review of plans and their assumptions. Plans often assume that other services will be available.
- 02
Dependency analysis
Mapping of dependencies between operators. Commercial confidentiality can limit sharing.
- 03
Joint exercises
Exercises involving operators and authorities test whether plans work together.
- 04
Incident analysis
Review of service disruptions and restoration times after events.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Optimisation and operations researchPre-positioning relief stocks · Evacuation and relief routing · Sequencing recovery investmentApplied here
- 02Decision analysis under uncertaintyWarning thresholds and false alarms · Pre-agreed triggers for actionApplied here
- 03Policy, institutional and decision scienceComparing emergency law · Tracing recurring findings · Mapping coordination structuresApplied here
Questions and answers.
What is an impact tolerance?
What does ISO 22301 cover?
Is continuity the same as disaster recovery?
Why is business continuity a governance question?
Does the platform audit continuity plans?
What is a common weakness in continuity plans?
Are small businesses included?
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