Information Integrity and Public Trust
The Global Risks Forum (GRF)
In a disaster, conflict or health emergency, accurate information is a matter of safety. Networks fail, rumours spread, and authorities, media and communities compete to be heard. Crisis information governance decides who informs, through which channels, and how false claims are handled without suppressing legitimate questions. This page sets out how crisis information holds or fails, the records that show it, and who decides.
GRF · In development · service level R0
Crisis information is the safety-critical information people need in disasters, conflicts and health emergencies, and the channels that carry it. Networks fail, rumours spread and shutdowns cut access. Emergency and humanitarian agencies, governments, broadcasters and platforms decide how information flows.
For crisis information, in GRF's situational-awareness reading, the map opens on population density, flood water and active fires with clouds now from NASA GIBS, framed on Eastern Europe; 3 further NASA layers wait in the list.
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Layers 3
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NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth
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For crisis information, in GRF's situational-awareness reading, the map opens on population density, flood water and active fires with clouds now from NASA GIBS, framed on Eastern Europe; 3 further NASA layers wait in the list.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date; indicators, not assessments of any place; claim ceiling INTEGRATED.
Layers and dates
The working screen behind this subject: its structure, terms and states. Names are placeholders and values illustrative.
Crisis information · Crisis information cell · Week 30
| Tap water poisoned after flood | 77 | High | False | Correction out |
| Shelters charging fees | 57 | Medium | False | Drafting |
| Dam about to fail | 77 | High | Checking | Holding line |
| Aid only for registered voters | 40 | Medium | False | Prebunked |
Warnings, risk communication and trust. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Power cuts and damaged networks silence online channels when they are most needed. Radio, loudspeakers and community networks become the main routes.
Early in a crisis, facts are scarce and demand for information is high. Rumours fill the gap and can drive harmful behaviour before official information arrives.
Information designed without asking affected people misses their questions and languages. Feedback mechanisms let responders hear what people need to know.
Governments sometimes restrict internet access or reporting during crises. These measures cut off safety information and documentation of events.
Each term as this page uses it. Where a standard-setting body defines the term, the wording follows that body.
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Rumour tracking | Systematic collection of rumours and questions in a crisis so that responders can answer them. |
| Internet shutdown | An intentional disruption of internet or electronic communications, making them inaccessible for a population or location. |
| Two-way communication | Giving affected people information and collecting their feedback to shape the response. |
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Internet shutdowns during crises | count and duration in hours | annual | Shutdown monitoring | REPORTED |
| Community feedback mechanisms in humanitarian responses | yes or no, by response | per response | Response records | REPORTED |
| Languages used in crisis messaging | count | per event | Message archives | OBSERVED |
| Journalists killed or detained in crisis zones | count | annual | Press freedom organizations | REPORTED |
| Rumours logged and addressed by responders | count | per response | Rumour tracking records | REPORTED |
| Access to radio among affected populations | share of households | per assessment | Needs assessments | ESTIMATED |
The topic as a computational graph: named sources feed the methods, an evidence review gates the outputs, and the decisions stay with the authorities that hold them.
Fig. 02Nodes carry their type, two metric rows and a state; connectors show what feeds what; dashed frames name the owners; the timeline is the cadence. Design of the pipeline, not a record of a run.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Source | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| Access Now KeepItOn data | Documented internet shutdowns | Free to read, terms to check |
| Committee to Protect Journalists databases | Journalists killed and imprisoned | Free to read, terms to check |
| CDAC Network resources | Communication and community engagement in humanitarian response | Free to read, terms to check |
| Internews rumour tracking methodology and reports | Rumour tracking in humanitarian settings | Free to read, terms to check |
| ReliefWeb | Situation reports including communication needs | Free, OCHA terms; content terms per author |
Information Integrity and Public Trust prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Who decides | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Emergency management and humanitarian agencies | How to assess and meet information needs | Feedback and rumour tracking practice |
| Governments and telecom regulators | Whether to restrict networks or reporting in a crisis | Evidence on effects of shutdowns and human rights standards |
| Broadcasters and local media | How to keep information flowing in a crisis | Crisis broadcasting practice |
| Platforms | How to surface authoritative information in a crisis | Crisis protocol practice and evaluations |
Crisis communication researchers ask how information can protect people when stakes are highest.
In the early stages of a crisis, demand for information exceeds supply. When official information is slow, inconsistent or absent, people turn to informal sources and rumours fill the gap. Social science research shows that people seek confirmation from family, peers and local sources before acting on warnings, and that consistent messages from multiple trusted sources increase protective action.
Communicating uncertainty is a central challenge. Authorities may fear that admitting uncertainty will cause panic or undermine authority, but evidence suggests that honest acknowledgement, with clear explanation of what is known and what is being done, tends to maintain trust better than false certainty that later proves wrong.
Surveys and interviews on how people received and used information, with social and behavioural science. Recall is imperfect.
Tracking rumours and information needs in real time using machine learning. Raises privacy and representativeness concerns.
Testing message clarity and effect before crises. Conditions differ in real events.
Comparing communication across crises. Context shapes outcomes.
The current service level is R0: information and enquiries. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.