R-P05 · TOPIC · ai-generated-informationGRF dossier · service level R0
GRFInformation Integrity and Public TrustIn development
Topic dossier · Information Integrity and Public Trust

AI generated information

Generative AI produces text, images, audio and video that can be hard to tell from human work. It lowers the cost of producing persuasive and false content, and of impersonating real people. Governance responds with provenance standards, labelling duties and platform rules, each with limits. This page sets out how AI-generated information affects integrity, the records that show it, and who decides.

Systems · around this subjectDesign, not a record

Narrative monitor

AI generated information · Crisis information cell · Week 34

Harmful rumour spreadingGRF · Information Integrity and Public Trust

Narratives

Tap water poisoned after flood81HighFalseCorrection out
Shelters charging fees64MediumFalseDrafting
Dam about to fail69HighCheckingHolding line
Aid only for registered voters22MediumFalsePrebunked

Spread

Response protocol

  1. Detectmonitor
  2. Verifyprovenance
  3. Assess harmthreshold
  4. Respondcorrect · prebunk
  5. Reporttransparency
Narrative monitor: the screen's structure, terms and states for AI generated information.Placeholder names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.

Fig.Narrative monitor. Design wireframe with placeholder names and illustrative values, not a record or a live system.

01In brief

The short answer.

AI-generated content is text, images, audio or video produced by generative AI, which can be hard to tell from human work. It lowers the cost of persuasion, deception and impersonation. Provenance standards, labelling duties and platform rules respond, with limits. Legislators, platforms, electoral authorities and newsrooms hold the decisions.

02Geography

Connected activity in Eastern Europe.

For ai generated information, in GRF's situational-awareness reading, the map opens on population density and night lights with night lights tonight from NASA GIBS, framed on Eastern Europe; 4 further NASA layers wait in the list.

The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.

Layers 2

Connected activity, for this page

Latest available

NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth

Loading the latest NASA imagery.

Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.

For ai generated information, in GRF's situational-awareness reading, the map opens on population density and night lights with night lights tonight from NASA GIBS, framed on Eastern Europe; 4 further NASA layers wait in the list.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date; indicators, not assessments of any place; claim ceiling INTEGRATED.

Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA/NOAA VIIRS · GDACS · NASA EONETSources and licences

  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). CC BY 4.0
  • VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), VIIRS 375 m active fire product, NASA LANCE; vector tiles via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Made with Natural Earth. Free vector and raster map data @ naturalearthdata.com. Public domain
  • © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). ODbL
  • Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Context on the globe and flat map: coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names from NASA GIBS reference layers (OpenStreetMap data, ODbL, © OpenStreetMap contributors); Blue Marble imagery as an optional base; 3D terrain and the elevation read-out from the ASTER GDEM elevation colour index (5 m to 200 m classes, exaggerated for legibility). Boundaries are drawn as published and imply no position on any territory.
  • Globe: MapLibre GL JS 6.9.1, BSD-3-Clause, © MapLibre contributors.
  • Observed (EO): NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • Live: GDACS (EC JRC / UN OCHA) Events are indicative, not official warnings.
  • Live: NASA EONET Events are indicative, not official warnings.
  • Optional layers (5 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.

Layers and dates

  • Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
  • Night-time lights, daily: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Oct 2026
  • Flood water, 3-day composite: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Oct 2026
  • Active fires and thermal anomalies, last day: VIIRS NOAA-20 375 m (FIRMS), NASA LANCE FIRMS · 13 Oct 2026
  • True colour: VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
  • Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024

03The question

AI generated information: how the risk develops.

Synthetic media and authenticity. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

Production cost collapses

Generating plausible text, images and voices is cheap and fast. Volume overwhelms review, and low-quality synthetic content fills search results and feeds.

Mechanism

Impersonation becomes easy

Voice and video clones of real people enable fraud, harassment and political deception. Victims include public figures and private individuals.

Mechanism

Detection is unreliable

Detectors produce false positives and miss content that has been edited or compressed. Reliance on detection alone can wrongly accuse genuine content.

Mechanism

Doubt devalues the real

When anything could be fake, genuine evidence can be dismissed as synthetic. This liar's dividend weakens documentation of real events.

04Key terms

Terms used on this page.

Each term as this page uses it. Where a standard-setting body defines the term, the wording follows that body.

TermDefinition
DeepfakeSynthetic or manipulated media that realistically depicts a person saying or doing something they did not.
Content credentialsProvenance information attached to media under the C2PA standard, recording creation and edits.
Liar's dividendThe benefit to those who dismiss genuine evidence as fake when synthetic media are known to exist.
05Indicators

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Platforms implementing content credentialscounton changeC2PA and platform recordsDECLARED
Synthetic content labelling rules in forcecount of jurisdictionson changeLegislationOFFICIAL
Reported deepfake incidentscount by harm typemonthlyIncident databasesREPORTED
Detection tool accuracytrue and false positive ratesper evaluationIndependent benchmarksESTIMATED
Election-related synthetic media incidentscountper electionMonitoring reportsREPORTED
Public ability to identify synthetic mediashare correct in testsper studyExperimental studiesESTIMATED
06Canvas

From sources to decisions.

The topic as a computational graph: named sources feed the methods, an evidence review gates the outputs, and the decisions stay with the authorities that hold them.

Pipeline canvas · AI generated information as a run graphDesign, not a record
AI generated information: responding to harmful informationPublic narratives are monitored; items are detected and their provenance verified; harm is assessed against a threshold; the response (correct, prebunk, label, escalate) is chosen and reported transparently. Design of the process, not a record of a run.

Fig. 02Nodes carry their type, two metric rows and a state; connectors show what feeds what; dashed frames name the owners; the timeline is the cadence. Design of the pipeline, not a record of a run.

07Sources

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

SourceWhat it givesLicence class
C2PA specifications and conformance recordsProvenance standard and adoptersFree, C2PA terms
OECD AI Incidents MonitorIncidents including synthetic media harmsFree, OECD terms
AI Incident DatabaseReported incidents involving AIOpen, licence to check
Partnership on AI Responsible Practices for Synthetic MediaFramework and case studies for synthetic mediaFree to read, terms to check
Electoral authority and observer reportsSynthetic media in election campaignsPublic records, terms per publisher
08Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Information Integrity and Public Trust prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Legislatures and AI regulatorsWhat labelling and disclosure duties apply to synthetic contentComparative rules and evidence on effects
Platforms and AI developersWhether to attach provenance and how to label contentStandards and implementation practice
Electoral authoritiesHow to address synthetic media in campaignsMonitoring reports and comparable rules
NewsroomsHow to verify media and disclose AI useVerification practice and standards

Outputs this topic produces

  • Guide to content provenance, watermarking and labelling
  • Comparative notes on synthetic media rules
  • Dialogue briefs on the limits of detection
  • Questions for electoral authorities on synthetic media
09Core questions

What experts ask.

Researchers on AI-generated information ask how to keep authentic evidence trustworthy.

  • How is generative AI changing the volume, quality and cost of misleading content?
  • How reliable are tools for detecting synthetic media, and how quickly do they become outdated?
  • Can provenance and watermarking establish authenticity at scale?
  • How does the possibility of synthetic media affect trust in genuine evidence?
  • What obligations should apply to developers, deployers and distributors of generative AI?
10Mechanisms and drivers

Cheaper fakes and doubted truths.

Generative AI lowers the cost of producing convincing false content, including impersonation of public figures and fabricated evidence. It also enables personalised and multilingual content at scale. At the same time, the mere possibility of synthetic media allows genuine evidence to be dismissed as fake, a dynamic sometimes called the liar's dividend.

Detection tools can identify some synthetic content, but they are imperfect and engage in a continuing race with generation methods. Provenance approaches, which attach verifiable information about origin and editing to content, offer a complementary path, but depend on wide adoption and can be stripped. No single technical measure solves the problem; institutional practices and media literacy matter alongside technology.

11Methods and data

How the evidence is built, and where it stops.

  1. 01

    Detection research

    Developing and evaluating classifiers with artificial intelligence and machine learning. Accuracy degrades as generators improve.

  2. 02

    Provenance standards

    Evaluating content credentials and watermarking. Adoption is incomplete and marks can be removed.

  3. 03

    Behavioural research

    Studying how people judge authenticity with social and behavioural science. People overestimate their ability to spot fakes.

  4. 04

    Incident analysis

    Studying real cases of synthetic media harm. Cases are often reported selectively.

12Methods

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Artificial intelligence and machine learningClassifier error in moderation · Synthetic media detection limits · Recommender auditsApplied here
  2. Social and behavioural scienceMeasuring trust and exposure · Testing interventions · Qualitative study of information needsApplied here
  3. Network science and contagionDetecting coordinated behaviour · Tracing narrative spread · Mapping media ecosystemsApplied here
14Questions

Questions and answers.

What are content credentials?
Provenance information attached to digital media under the C2PA standard, recording how content was created and edited, which others can verify cryptographically.
Can AI-generated content be reliably detected?
Not reliably in all cases. Detectors make errors, especially on edited or compressed media, so provenance and context are used alongside detection.
What is the liar's dividend?
The benefit to people who dismiss genuine evidence as fake, made easier when the public knows realistic synthetic media exist.
Can AI-generated content always be detected?
No. Detection tools have significant error rates and become less reliable as generation improves. They are best used alongside provenance and human verification.
Is all AI-generated content harmful?
No. Generative AI has many legitimate uses. The concern is deceptive use and the erosion of trust in authentic content.
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