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GRF · Information Integrity and Public Trust

Misinformation and disinformation

Misinformation is false or misleading content shared without intent to deceive; disinformation is spread deliberately, often in coordinated campaigns. Both exploit attention, emotion and gaps in trusted information. Responses range from labelling and prebunking to platform rules and law, and each carries risks to free expression. This page sets out how false information spreads and is countered, the records that measure it, and who decides.

01Register

Misinformation and disinformation on the record.

02The question

Misinformation and disinformation: how the risk develops.

Information harms and analytical limits. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

Engagement rewards the sensational

Ranking systems that optimise for engagement favour emotive and novel content, which false claims often are. Reach grows faster than corrections can follow.

Mechanism

Coordination amplifies

Networks of accounts, paid influencers and automated tools make fringe narratives look popular. Coordinated inauthentic behaviour is a pattern of conduct as much as a content problem.

Mechanism

Gaps invite false claims

Where authority information is late, unclear or distrusted, people fill the gap with whatever circulates. Data voids on new topics are exploited quickly.

Mechanism

Remedies risk overreach

Laws against false information can be used against journalists and critics. Responses that target behaviour and transparency carry less risk to expression than bans on content.

03Decision model

What tips a population into acting.

How the share of early movers and the thresholds people hold decide whether a protective behaviour, or a false narrative, stays local or spreads to most people. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.

Controls

Mean threshold (share of neighbours)
18%
Spread of thresholds
8 points
Early movers
2.0% of people
Contacts per person
8

Readouts

Share who acted in the end
100%
Global cascade
Yes
Steps to settle
11
Numbers, methods and sources
StepShare who have acted (%)
01.8
15.3
214.0
329.8
449.8
567.3
680.5
789.8
897.8
999.8
10100.0
11100.0

Methods

  1. Threshold models of collective behaviour Granovetter (1978), American Journal of Sociology 83
  2. Global cascades on random networks Watts (2002), PNAS 99
  3. Complex contagions Centola and Macy (2007), American Journal of Sociology 113
  4. One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley

Data

No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme's own evidence.

What tips a population into acting. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: Threshold models of collective behaviour (Granovetter (1978), American Journal of Sociology 83); Global cascades on random networks (Watts (2002), PNAS 99); Complex contagions (Centola and Macy (2007), American Journal of Sociology 113).
04Indicators

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Coordinated inauthentic behaviour networks removedcount by platform and originquarterlyPlatform threat reportsREPORTED
Fact-checks publishedcount by country and topicmonthlyFact-checking databasesREPORTED
Exposure to false contentshare of users exposedper studyResearch audits and panelsESTIMATED
Prevalence of misinformation in sampled contentshare of sampled itemsper studyContent auditsESTIMATED
Laws penalising false informationcount by countryon changeLegal databasesPublished statistics
Self-reported concern about what is real onlineshare of respondentsannualDigital News Report surveyESTIMATED
05Implementation

From mandate to evaluation, by pillar.

The steps an instrument takes from mandate to evaluation, each with the pillar that runs it, and the decisions that stay with the authority. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.

  1. Mandate and problem framing Competent authority (outside the programme)
    A competent authority frames the problem and the mandate under its own rules. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009)
  2. Evidence and system model Foundry
    The system is modelled with its feedbacks, data and stated limits. OECD (2014), principle 2
  3. Options appraised with scenarios Foundry
    Instruments are compared under scenarios, with uncertainty shown. Hood (1983)
  4. Exercise with stakeholders Universe
    The options are tested in an exercise with those who would implement and bear them. OECD (2014), principle 3
  5. Standard or guidance drafted Nexus Standards
    What works is codified as a standard or guidance, open to comment. Nexus Standards process
  6. Decision by the authority Competent authority (outside the programme)
    The authority decides, outside the programme, with the evidence on record. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009)
  7. Capacity and training Risk Academy
    Those who implement are trained on the decided instrument and its data. Sendai Framework (2015), priority 2
  8. Monitoring and public report Reports
    Indicators are published with sources, limits and corrections. OECD (2014), principle 5
  9. Evaluation and revision Nexus Standards
    Results return to the standard and the model: the cycle closes. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009)

Methods

  1. Policy cycle Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009), Studying Public Policy, Oxford University Press
  2. Governance of critical risks OECD (2014), Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Critical Risks
  3. Layered drawing of directed graphs Sugiyama, Tagawa and Toda (1981), IEEE SMC 11
From mandate to evaluation, by pillar: the steps as recorded, each with its pillar; sources as cited on each step.
06Sources

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

SourceWhat it givesLicence class
EU Disinformation Code transparency centre reportsSignatories' reports on implementing commitmentsFree to read, terms to check
Platform threat and coordinated behaviour reportsNetworks removed and tactics observedFree to read, terms per platform
Google Fact Check Explorer and ClaimReview dataPublished fact-checks tagged with structured dataFree to access, terms to check
Reuters Institute Digital News ReportSurvey of news use and concern about misinformation across many countriesFree to read, terms to check
EUvsDisinfo databaseCases of pro-Kremlin disinformation compiled by the EEAS East StratCom Task ForceFree to read, EU terms
07Instruments and commitments

How misinformation and disinformation is governed: instruments, mandates and commitments.

The instruments, mandates, actors and accountability arrangements a policymaker, diplomat or development agency works with, citing the agreements that set them. Structures follow the frameworks named. Any state or progress drawn is illustrative, not a record.

Accountability cycle

How commitments on misinformation and disinformation are held to account, from commitment to correction.

  1. CommitGovernmentA commitment with a mandate and a legal basis.
  2. PlanLead agencyA national plan with owners and milestones.
  3. ResourceMinistry of financeA budget line or financing on record.
  4. ImplementAgencies and local governmentDelivery against the plan.
  5. ReportStatistics officeIndicators reported in agreed definitions.
  6. ReviewLegislature, audit, civil societyIndependent review of results and gaps.
  7. CorrectGovernmentChanges to the plan, published with reasons.
A generic accountability cycle; the owner of each step follows the country's own constitution and law.
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction · UNDRRParis Agreement · UNFCCC2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals · United NationsInternational Health Regulations · WHO
08Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Information Integrity and Public Trust prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
LegislaturesWhether and how law addresses false information without restricting expressionComparative laws and their documented use
Platform trust and safety teamsWhich behaviours and content to act on and howNetwork analyses and transparency practice
Digital services regulatorsWhether platforms assess and mitigate systemic risks adequatelyRisk assessments, audits and researcher evidence
Electoral authoritiesHow to protect elections from manipulationLessons from past elections and platform reports

Outputs this topic produces

  • Guide to the difference between misinformation, disinformation and malinformation
  • Comparative notes on legal and platform responses and their risks to expression
  • Dialogue briefs on prebunking and media literacy evidence
  • Questions for regulators assessing disinformation measures
09Core questions

What experts ask.

Researchers on misinformation and disinformation ask questions that resist easy answers.

  • How prevalent is false or misleading content, and how much of it do people actually see?
  • Who shares it, why, and through which networks?
  • Does exposure change beliefs and behaviour, and for whom?
  • How are coordinated disinformation campaigns organised, and how can they be detected?
  • Which responses reduce harm without suppressing legitimate speech?
10Mechanisms and drivers

Spread, susceptibility and context.

False content can spread through social networks, especially when it is novel, emotional or confirms existing beliefs. Network research shows that a small number of highly active accounts often account for much of the sharing. Coordinated campaigns, sometimes using automated or inauthentic accounts, can amplify narratives and make fringe views appear widespread.

Exposure does not translate simply into belief or action. Research suggests that effects are concentrated among those already predisposed, that people use many sources, and that distrust in institutions makes alternative narratives more attractive. Measuring harm is difficult, and estimates of prevalence depend heavily on definitions and data access. Overstating the problem can itself erode trust and justify disproportionate responses.

Why now: the UN Global Principles for Information Integrity (2024) and new platform rules, such as the European Union's Digital Services Act fully applicable since 2024, have set expectations, while generative AI lowers the cost of false content. The platform is designed to compare responses that protect freedom of expression; it does not fact-check.

11Methods and data

How the evidence is built, and where it stops.

  1. 01

    Content and network analysis

    Tracing how content spreads using network science. Platform data access is limited and uneven.

  2. 02

    Automated detection

    Classifiers that flag likely false or coordinated content using machine learning. Error rates and biases need disclosure.

  3. 03

    Experimental research

    Testing effects of exposure and interventions with social and behavioural science. Lab settings may not reflect real behaviour.

  4. 04

    Case investigation

    Detailed study of specific campaigns. Attribution to actors is often uncertain.

12Methods

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Social and behavioural scienceMeasuring trust and exposure · Testing interventions · Qualitative study of information needsApplied here
  2. Network science and contagionDetecting coordinated behaviour · Tracing narrative spread · Mapping media ecosystemsApplied here
  3. Artificial intelligence and machine learningClassifier error in moderation · Synthetic media detection limits · Recommender auditsApplied here
13Questions

Questions and answers.

What is the difference between misinformation and disinformation?
Misinformation is false or misleading content shared without intent to deceive; disinformation is false content created or spread deliberately to deceive or cause harm.
What is prebunking?
Warning people in advance about manipulation techniques or likely false claims, so they recognise them later. Experimental studies report effects of varying size and duration.
Do laws against false news work?
Evidence on their effect is limited, and human rights bodies have documented their use against journalists and critics. Many experts favour transparency and process duties over content bans.
Is all false information harmful?
No. Much is trivial or quickly corrected. Harm depends on content, reach, audience and context, which is why careful analysis matters.
Can disinformation be reliably attributed to its source?
Sometimes, with strong technical and contextual evidence. Often attribution remains uncertain, and claims should state their confidence.
Do fact-checks work?
Research suggests corrections can reduce belief in specific false claims, but effects vary and may fade. They are one tool among several.
ReportsContribute

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Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

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