The Global Risks Forum (GRF)
Scenarios are structured descriptions of plausible alternative futures, built so that an institution can test its strategy against conditions it does not expect. They are not forecasts and carry no probability. Their worth lies in widening the range of futures that decision-makers take seriously, exposing hidden assumptions and preparing options in advance. This page sets out how scenario work is designed, how it succeeds or fails inside institutions, and who uses it.
GRF · Established · service level R0
Scenario planning is the use of structured descriptions of plausible alternative futures to test whether a strategy holds under conditions an institution does not expect. Scenarios are not forecasts and carry no probability; their worth lies in widening the futures decision-makers take seriously and in signposts that show which one is unfolding.
For strategic scenarios, in GRF's situational-awareness reading, the map opens on population density, daytime surface heat, rain and flood water with relief in 3D and clouds now from NASA GIBS, framed on the Arctic; every other NASA layer, live feed and forecast waits in the layer list.
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For strategic scenarios, in GRF's situational-awareness reading, the map opens on population density, daytime surface heat, rain and flood water with relief in 3D and clouds now from NASA GIBS, framed on the Arctic; every other NASA layer, live feed and forecast waits in the layer list.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date; indicators, not assessments of any place; claim ceiling INTEGRATED.
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The working screen behind this subject: its structure, terms and states. Names are placeholders and values illustrative.
Strategic scenarios · Scenario set B · Policy: POL-56
0 fails to 100 robust
Higher is more robust. Placeholder scores.
Plausible alternative futures. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Scenario design starts by separating predetermined elements, such as cohorts already born, from critical uncertainties whose direction is open and whose impact is large. The choice of uncertainties shapes everything that follows, so it is documented and challenged.
Each scenario follows a coherent logic from today to the horizon. Consistency checks remove combinations that cannot coexist; divergence ensures the set spans futures that would call for different responses.
Policies and plans are wind-tunnelled against every scenario. A strategy that works in only one future is fragile; one that holds across the set, or can be adapted in time, is robust.
Scenarios fail when they are written to confirm an agreed plan, when a preferred scenario quietly becomes the forecast, or when the set is never refreshed. Ownership by a decision-holder and a review schedule keep them in use.
Each term as this page uses it. Where a standard-setting body defines the term, the wording follows that body.
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Critical uncertainty | A driver that is both highly uncertain and highly important, used to define scenario axes. |
| Wind-tunnelling | Testing a strategy against each scenario to see where it holds and where it fails. |
| Signpost | An observable indicator that a particular scenario is becoming more likely. |
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scenario sets in current use by government | count of published sets | annual | Published foresight reports | OFFICIAL |
| Policies and strategies tested against a scenario set | count per planning cycle | per cycle | Cabinet and ministry planning records | OFFICIAL |
| Interval between scenario refreshes | months | per set | Publication record | OFFICIAL |
| Participant range in scenario exercises | persons by sector, region and age group | per exercise | Workshop records | REPORTED |
| Signposts tracked against each scenario | count of signposts | quarterly | Signpost register | REPORTED |
| Strategies citing scenario evidence | share of strategy documents | annual | Document analysis | ESTIMATED |
The topic as a computational graph: named sources feed the methods, an evidence review gates the outputs, and the decisions stay with the authorities that hold them.
Fig. 02Nodes carry their type, two metric rows and a state; connectors show what feeds what; dashed frames name the owners; the timeline is the cadence. Design of the pipeline, not a record of a run.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Source | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| IPCC AR6 Scenario Database (hosted by IIASA) | Quantified emissions, energy and land pathways from integrated assessment models assessed by the IPCC | Free with attribution, database licence terms |
| SSP Database (IIASA) | Population, urbanisation and economic projections for each shared socioeconomic pathway | Free with registration, IIASA terms |
| IEA World Energy Outlook scenarios | Stated policies, announced pledges and net zero pathways for energy supply and demand | IEA terms, part free and part licensed |
| NGFS climate scenarios | Transition and physical risk scenarios used by central banks and supervisors | Free with attribution |
| US National Intelligence Council Global Trends | Long-range scenarios on global structural forces, published each presidential term | Public domain, US government work |
| UK Ministry of Defence Global Strategic Trends | Long-horizon trend analysis and alternative futures for defence and security planning | Open Government Licence |
Foresight Nexus prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Who decides | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Cabinet offices and prime ministers' strategy units | Whether a national strategy holds across plausible futures, or needs contingent options | Scenario sets with their uncertainties and assumptions, wind-tunnel results and the signposts to watch |
| Central banks and prudential supervisors | Which climate and macro-financial scenarios to use in supervisory exercises | Scenario narratives, their parameter choices and their coverage of severe but plausible conditions |
| Ministries of defence and foreign affairs | Which capabilities and partnerships remain sound across alternative security environments | Alternative futures with the drivers that separate them and the institutional responses each calls for |
| Energy ministries and system operators | Which investments hold across energy transition pathways | Published pathways compared on demand, technology and policy assumptions |
Scenario practice has deep roots in military planning and corporate strategy, where it helped organizations prepare for shocks that conventional forecasts missed. A common approach identifies the critical uncertainties, the forces that matter most and are least predictable, and builds contrasting futures around them. Other approaches start from a desired or feared end state and work backwards, or develop scenarios through participatory processes with stakeholders.
Scenarios change decisions when they are developed with the people who will use them, when they are challenging but plausible, and when they are used to test specific strategies. They fail when they are too close to the official forecast, when one scenario is treated as the preferred future, or when they are produced by outsiders and handed over without engagement.
Structured identification of forces, ranked by importance and uncertainty.
Coherent, internally consistent stories that describe how each future could emerge.
Models from scenario design and stress testing and complex systems and agent-based modelling add consistency and scale where data allows.
Scenarios reflect the imagination and biases of those who build them, cannot be validated in advance, and can be misread as forecasts if not carefully labelled.
The current service level is R0: information and enquiries. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.