GRF · AI and Digital Governance
Cyber and public infrastructure
Public services and critical infrastructure run on digital systems that attackers target and that fail through error. Cyber governance sets security obligations, incident reporting duties and the authorities that coordinate response. This page sets out how cyber risk to public infrastructure develops and how governance responds, the records that show it, and who holds the decisions.
How the work runs.
Public algorithm register
Cyber and public infrastructure · Algorithm register · Quarter 3
Registered systems
| Benefit fraud flagging | Social agency | Juu | Missing | Partial |
| Permit triage | Planning | Limited | Done | Yes |
| School placement | Education | Juu | Done | Yes |
| Chat assistant | Tax office | Minimal | Done | n/a |
Oversight action
- Mfumo
- Benefit fraud flagging
- Required
- impact assessment, appeal route
- Deadline
- 38 days
- Authority
- Oversight body
Complaints about automated decisions
Fig.Public algorithm register: example names and illustrative values, not a record or a live system.
Cyber and public infrastructure: how the risk develops.
Governance of digital dependencies. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Legacy systems persist
Public bodies run old software that is costly to replace and hard to secure. Budget cycles favour new services over patching and replacement, so known weaknesses stay.
Suppliers carry shared risk
Many agencies use the same software, cloud and managed service providers. A compromise of one supplier reaches all its customers at once.
Incidents cross sectors
Ransomware at a hospital, utility or local council disrupts physical services. Dependencies between digital and physical infrastructure turn a cyber incident into a public safety event.
Reporting shapes response
Mandatory incident reporting to national authorities lets them warn others and coordinate. Late or partial reporting leaves other targets exposed.
Connected activity in East Asia.
Night lights, population density and flood water over East Asia, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.
Ramani shirikishi inahitaji JavaScript. Orodha ya tabaka na vyanzo imetolewa hapa chini.
Tabaka 3
Connected activity, for this page
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Imeonekana
- Chanzo
- VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2) (NASA LAADS DAAC)
- Mtoaji
- NASA LAADS DAAC
- Leseni
- Data huria ya NASA
- Tarehe ya data
- kila siku; Mng'ao wa setilaiti, uliorekebishwa kwa mwanga wa mwezi na angahewa
- Ya hivi karibuni wakati wa ujenzi
- 2026-10-12
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban mita 500
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Mng'ao wa usiku kutoka setilaiti kwa tarehe iliyoonyeshwa; taa ni kiashiria cha matumizi na kukatika kwa umeme, si kipimo cha usambazaji au upatikanaji.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Imekadiriwa
- Chanzo
- Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Chuo Kikuu cha Columbia))
- Mtoaji
- NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Chuo Kikuu cha Columbia)
- Leseni
- CC BY 4.0
- Tarehe ya data
- null; Makadirio yanayotokana na sensa, isiyobadilika (2020)
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban kilomita 1
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Makadirio yanayotokana na sensa ya watu kwa kila kilomita ya mraba mwaka 2020, yanayoonyeshwa kama muktadha wa mfiduo; si hesabu ya watu walioathiriwa na janga lolote.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Imeonekana
- Chanzo
- Mwangaza uliorekebishwa wa VIIRS NOAA-20 (NASA LANCE)
- Mtoaji
- NASA LANCE
- Leseni
- Data huria ya NASA
- Tarehe ya data
- kila siku; Picha ya satelaiti
- Ya hivi karibuni wakati wa ujenzi
- 2026-10-14
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban mita 250
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Picha ya satelaiti. Raster ya satelaiti au ya muundo kama mtoa huduma anavyoichapisha. Mawingu, mapengo ya ukanda na makosa ya upatikanaji huacha mapengo na kelele; thamani ni viashiria, si vipimo mahali fulani.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Imeonekana (mawingu huacha mapengo)
- Chanzo
- Bidhaa ya Mafuriko ya Kimataifa ya VIIRS (NASA LANCE)
- Mtoaji
- NASA LANCE
- Leseni
- Data huria ya NASA
- Tarehe ya data
- kila siku; Ugunduzi wa setilaiti; mawingu huacha mapengo
- Ya hivi karibuni wakati wa ujenzi
- 2026-10-14
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban mita 250
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Ugunduzi wa setilaiti; mawingu huacha mapengo. Raster ya setilaiti au modeli kama mtoaji anavyoichapisha. Mawingu, mapengo ya mkondo wa setilaiti na makosa ya upimaji huacha mapengo na kelele; thamani ni viashiria, si vipimo mahali fulani.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Imeonekana (mawingu na muda wa kupita kwa setilaiti huacha mapengo)
- Chanzo
- VIIRS NOAA-20 mita 375 (FIRMS) (NASA LANCE FIRMS)
- Mtoaji
- NASA LANCE FIRMS
- Leseni
- Data huria ya NASA
- Tarehe ya data
- kila siku; Ugunduzi wa setilaiti; mawingu na muda wa kupita kwa setilaiti huacha mapengo
- Ya hivi karibuni wakati wa ujenzi
- 2026-10-13
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban mita 500
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Ugunduzi wa setilaiti wa maeneo ya joto kwa siku iliyoonyeshwa, ikiwemo miale ya gesi na joto la viwandani; si moto uliothibitishwa, ripoti ya tukio au onyo.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kuhusu tabaka hili
- Ushahidi
- Modelled (latest year GIBS publishes)
- Chanzo
- MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1) (NASA LP DAAC)
- Mtoaji
- NASA LP DAAC
- Leseni
- Data huria ya NASA
- Tarehe ya data
- yearly; Satellite classification; latest year GIBS publishes
- Ya hivi karibuni wakati wa ujenzi
- 2024-01-01
- Ubora wa picha
- gridi ya takriban mita 500
- Kutokuwa na uhakika
- Satellite land cover classes for the year shown, including croplands; a classification with known errors, not a farm register.
- Imefikiwa kupitia
- kipeperushi cha data cha tovuti hii, kutoka gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Kibodi, ramani ikiwa imelengwa
Shikilia Ctrl au ⌘ na usogeze ili kukuza
Ya karibuni zaidi inayopatikana
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © wachangiaji wa OpenStreetMap (ODbL) · Natural Earth
Inapakia picha za hivi karibuni za NASA.
Buruta ili kusogeza. Ctrl au ⌘ na usogeze, bana au tumia vitufe ili kukuza; elea juu ili kuona thamani zilizo chini ya kiashiria; weka upya hurudisha kwenye eneo.
Connected activity, framed on East Asia.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.
Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · NASA/NOAA VIIRS · U.S. Geological SurveySources and licences
- We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
- VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), VIIRS 375 m active fire product, NASA LANCE; vector tiles via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). Cite as: NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA open data
- Imetengenezwa kwa Natural Earth. Data huria za ramani za vekta na rasta @ naturalearthdata.com. Kikoa cha umma
- © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). ODbL
- Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- Muktadha kwenye tufe na ramani bapa: mwambao, mipaka, barabara na majina ya mahali kutoka tabaka za marejeo za NASA GIBS (data ya OpenStreetMap, ODbL, © wachangiaji wa OpenStreetMap); picha za Blue Marble kama msingi wa hiari; ardhi ya 3D na usomaji wa mwinuko kutoka faharasa ya rangi ya mwinuko ya ASTER GDEM (madaraja ya 5 m hadi 200 m, yaliyokuzwa ili yasomeke). Mipaka imechorwa kama ilivyochapishwa na haimaanishi msimamo wowote kuhusu eneo lolote.
- Matukio ya moja kwa moja: NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker (EONET); matukio ni ya kuashiria tu na yanabaki na viungo vya vyanzo vyao asili.
- Observed (EO): NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
- Moja kwa moja: NASA EONET. Matukio ni ya kuashiria tu, si tahadhari rasmi za mamlaka.
- Moja kwa moja: U.S. Geological Survey. Matukio ni ya kuashiria tu, si tahadhari rasmi za mamlaka.
- NASA GIBS: Tunatambua matumizi ya picha zinazotolewa na huduma za Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS) za NASA, sehemu ya Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS) ya NASA.
- Optional layers (5 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.
Tabaka na tarehe
- Taa za usiku, kila siku: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Okt 2026
- Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
- Rangi halisi: VIIRS NOAA-20 mng'ao uliosahihishwa, NASA LANCE · 13 Okt 2026
- Maji ya mafuriko, mchanganyiko wa siku 3: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Okt 2026
- Moto unaowaka na hitilafu za joto: VIIRS NOAA-20 375 m (FIRMS), NASA LANCE FIRMS · 13 Okt 2026
- Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| National cybersecurity strategy in force | yes or no | on change | Government records | Published statistics |
| National computer security incident response team | yes or no, with mandate | on change | FIRST and ITU records | Published statistics |
| Significant incidents reported by public bodies | count by sector | annual | National authority reports | Published statistics |
| Global Cybersecurity Index tier | tier, categorical | periodic | ITU | IMEKADIRIWA |
| Known exploited vulnerabilities remediated within deadline | share | periodic | Agency compliance reports | IMERIPOTIWA |
| Public service downtime from cyber incidents | hours | per incident | Incident reports | IMERIPOTIWA |
Where coupling turns damage into an outage.
How spare capacity and dependencies between sectors decide whether local damage stays local, the levers resilience regulation and investment can pull. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows East Asia; the model itself is not tied to a place.
Controls
- Assets per layer
- 18
- Hazard footprint
- 8% of area
- Assets that depend on another layer
- 60%
- Spare capacity (tolerance)
- 30%
Readouts
- Assets hit by the hazard
- 7%
- Assets still working
- 20%
- Amplification of the initial damage
- 10.8 times
- Steps to settle
- 4
Numbers, methods and sources
| Step | Data centres working (%) | Networks working (%) | Power working (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 89 | 89 | 100 |
| 1 | 56 | 72 | 94 |
| 2 | 50 | 33 | 28 |
| 3 | 33 | 33 | 11 |
| 4 | 22 | 33 | 6 |
Mbinu
- Interdependent networks Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464
- Overload cascades Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66
- Betweenness load Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25
- Multilayer networks Kivela and others (2014), Journal of Complex Networks 2
- Infrastructure interdependencies Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001), IEEE Control Systems 21(6)
- Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
- One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Data
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page’s map can draw:
- Major roads Natural Earth
- Railways Natural Earth
- Seaports Natural Earth
- Airports Natural Earth
- Urban extents Natural Earth
- Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band) NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP) · register nasa.gibs.context-live-layers
- Natural events (NASA EONET) NASA EONET · register nasa.eonet.events
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in AI and Digital Governance in Foundry
- Tested at AI and Digital Governance in Universe
- Codified in Digital, Cyber and AI in Standards
- Published in AI and Digital Governance in Reports
- Taught in Faculty of Technology and Digital Systems in Academy
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Chanzo | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| ITU Global Cybersecurity Index | Country commitments on legal, technical, organisational, capacity and cooperation measures | Free to read, ITU terms |
| ENISA Threat Landscape and NIS incident reports | Threats and incidents across EU sectors | Free, ENISA terms |
| CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue | Vulnerabilities known to be exploited, with remediation deadlines for US federal agencies | Kikoa cha umma |
| National cyber security centre annual reviews | Incidents handled and threat assessments | Public records, terms per centre |
| FIRST member directory | Incident response teams and their constituencies | Free to read, FIRST terms |
From mandate to evaluation, by pillar.
The steps an instrument takes from mandate to evaluation, each with the pillar that runs it, and the decisions that stay with the authority. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows East Asia; the model itself is not tied to a place.
- Mandate and problem framing Competent authority (outside the programme)
A competent authority frames the problem and the mandate under its own rules. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) - Evidence and system model Foundry
The system is modelled with its feedbacks, data and stated limits. OECD (2014), principle 2 - Options appraised with scenarios Foundry
Instruments are compared under scenarios, with uncertainty shown. Hood (1983) - Exercise with stakeholders Universe
The options are tested in an exercise with those who would implement and bear them. OECD (2014), principle 3 - Standard or guidance drafted Nexus Standards
What works is codified as a standard or guidance, open to comment. Nexus Standards process - Decision by the authority Competent authority (outside the programme)
The authority decides, outside the programme, with the evidence on record. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) - Capacity and training Risk Academy
Those who implement are trained on the decided instrument and its data. Sendai Framework (2015), priority 2 - Monitoring and public report Reports
Indicators are published with sources, limits and corrections. OECD (2014), principle 5 - Evaluation and revision Nexus Standards
Results return to the standard and the model: the cycle closes. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009)
Mbinu
- Policy cycle Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009), Studying Public Policy, Oxford University Press
- Governance of critical risks OECD (2014), Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Critical Risks
- Layered drawing of directed graphs Sugiyama, Tagawa and Toda (1981), IEEE SMC 11
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in AI and Digital Governance in Foundry
- Tested at AI and Digital Governance in Universe
- Codified in Digital, Cyber and AI in Standards
- Published in AI and Digital Governance in Reports
- Taught in Faculty of Technology and Digital Systems in Academy
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
AI and Digital Governance prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Nani anaamua | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| National cybersecurity authorities | Which obligations apply and how incidents are coordinated | Comparative regimes and incident data |
| Public body leadership | How much to invest in security and legacy replacement | Threat data and comparable practice |
| Legislatures | Which sectors fall under cyber obligations and reporting duties | Comparative laws and incident evidence |
| Procurement authorities | What security requirements suppliers must meet | Supply chain incident evidence and standards |
Outputs this topic produces
- Comparative notes on cyber obligations for public bodies
- Guide to incident reporting regimes and timelines
- Dialogue briefs on shared supplier risk in public services
- Questions for public boards on cyber oversight
Exercise a cascade in cyber and public infrastructure with the people who decide.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Cyber and digital risk standards: the hazards it names, the systems and communities that carry the loss, the controls and institutions that dampen it and the data that observe it. Pick an initiating event and step through the cascade to see where mandates meet and which decisions fall to whom. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every weight is a stated assumption. An exercise for dialogue, not a forecast, an assessment or a position. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
Majanga
- Dam failure
- River flood (set off downstream)
- Flash flood (set off downstream)
- Mass displacement (set off downstream)
- Widespread power outage (set off downstream)
- Water supply shortfall (set off downstream)
Systems and couplings
Controls
NS-0Katiba na kanuniNS-9UNI za kimuktadha (utekelezaji, matukio, matukio ya programu)NS-10Sera na vifungu (wajibu unaosomeka na mashine: ufafanuzi, ufungamanishaji, tathmini na utekelezaji)NS-11Uthibitishaji na ufuatiliaji (ushahidi, uthibitisho, uchunguzi wa ulinganifu usio na imani)NS-12Vitu vya programu, miundo na AI/ML (mnyororo wa ugavi, kadi za miundo, karatasi za seti za data)NRS-H94Familia ya majanga: Matukio ya kimtandao ya kimfumo (NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber)NRS-X6Hatari za usalama wa mtandao na kidijitaliNRS-H51Familia ya majanga: Uvamizi wa kihasama (NHS-1 cyber.intrusion)NRS-T8Hatari za uadilifu wa programu na mnyororo wa ugaviNRS-H93Familia ya majanga: Kushindwa kwa utambulisho, uaminifu na usimbaji fiche (NHS-1 cyber.identity)NRS-H54Familia ya majanga: Usumbufu wa ishara na majukwaa (NHS-1 cyber.platform)
Observation
- National Vulnerability Database (CVE enrichment API) (listed for reference)
- Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue (listed for reference)
- OSV open source vulnerability database (listed for reference)
- MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base (STIX 2.1) (listed for reference)
- Proportion of population covered by a mobile network, by technology
- Fixed Internet broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
Example geography
- North America: 243 hexagonal cells
- Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
- Surface water through cloud, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 radar), NASA GIBS
- Rain rate, last half hour (IMERG), NASA GIBS
- Surface soil moisture (SMAP), NASA GIBS
What institutions ask about digital dependencies.
- Which public services would stop if a given system, provider or network failed?
- Who is responsible for securing each dependency, and are those responsibilities clear in contracts?
- How are incidents reported, coordinated and communicated to the public?
- How exposed is the public sector to a single provider or software component?
How cyber and public infrastructure is governed: instruments, mandates and commitments.
The instruments, mandates, actors and accountability arrangements a policymaker, diplomat or development agency works with, citing the agreements that set them. Structures follow the frameworks named. Any state or progress drawn is illustrative, not a record.
Policy instrument matrix
The kinds of instrument available on cyber and public infrastructure, by level of government and cooperation.
| Instrument type | Local | Kitaifa | Kikanda | Kimataifa |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regulatory | Zoning, building codes | Laws, standards, licensing | Harmonised rules | Conventions and treaties |
| Economic | Local levies, grants | Budget lines, taxes, insurance schemes | Risk pools, regional funds | Financing mechanisms |
| Information | Local warnings | Disclosure, early warning, statistics | Data sharing arrangements | Global monitoring and reporting |
| Institutional | Local committees | Lead agencies, coordination councils | Regional bodies and secretariats | Multilateral mandates |
| Cooperative | Community agreements | Partnership compacts | Memoranda and joint programmes | Agreements and joint commitments |
How cyber risk reaches public services.
Ransomware attacks on hospitals, local governments and schools have shown how quickly encrypted systems can halt services, with patients diverted and payments delayed. Supply chain compromises, in which attackers enter through a trusted software update or provider, can reach many organisations at once. Faulty updates from a single vendor have also disrupted services widely without any attack at all.
Public bodies often have older systems, limited security staff and complex procurement, which makes them attractive targets. Responsibility is fragmented between the agency, its suppliers and national cyber authorities. Concentration on a few cloud and software providers creates efficiency and security benefits but also shared points of failure.
Why now: cyber incidents now halt hospitals, ports and payments, and the UN process on security in the use of information technologies agreed in 2025 to move to a permanent mechanism. The platform is designed to convene public infrastructure owners on decision rights during an incident and exercise them without touching live systems.
Instruments of governance.
- 01
Dependency mapping
Identifying which services depend on which systems and providers. Limits: hidden sub-dependencies.
- 02
Baseline security requirements
Minimum controls for public bodies and suppliers. Limits: compliance does not ensure security.
- 03
Incident reporting and coordination
Mandatory reporting and national coordination. Limits: under-reporting and slow information sharing.
- 04
Mazoezi
Cross-agency cyber exercises. Limits: participants know it is an exercise.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Policy, institutional and decision scienceComparing AI regimes · Value chain accountability mapping · Forum and mandate mappingApplied here
- 02Digital identity and public digital systemsAssurance levels for public services · Minimal disclosure · Exclusion analysisApplied here
- 03Artificial intelligence and machine learningHow models fail in deployment · Reading model documentation · Agent architectures explainedApplied here
Questions and answers.
What is a CSIRT?
What does NIS2 require?
Why are public bodies frequent targets?
Should I report a cyber incident to the platform?
Is moving to cloud safer for public bodies?
Does the platform publish vulnerability information?
Why is responsibility for public cyber security fragmented?
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Reports ni chapisho la kila robo mwaka la Muungano. Unachojua kuhusu somo hili kinaweza kuwa ushahidi, kisa au sahihisho katika toleo lijalo, kikitajwa kwa jina lako na kuchapishwa chini ya CC BY 4.0 pale ambapo ni kazi yako mwenyewe.
- EmailGateway GW-GRFSend it from this pageEvidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen depositDeposit it and submit to the communityPublish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsGlobal Risks ForumSee every way to contributeThe contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
Usitume kamwe data binafsi, maelezo nyeti ya miundombinu wala chochote ambacho huna haki ya kukishiriki. Mchango hupitiwa kabla ya kutumika; kuutuma hakutoi haki za uandishi wala za uhariri, na udhamini haununui matokeo.
Bring a governance question to the Forum.
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Legal documents.
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Maps, data and figures on this site are shown for context and general information. They are not advice, forecasts or warnings; the limits of the information are set out in the Disclaimers and Data Notices.