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GRF · زیرەکی دەستکرد و حوکمڕانیی دیجیتاڵ

چاودێری و بەرپرسیارێتیی زیرەکی دەستکرد

When an AI system causes harm, someone must be able to find out what happened and answer for it. Oversight relies on documentation, logging, audit, incident reporting and authorities with the powers and skills to use them. Accountability is spread across developers, deployers, boards and regulators, and can dissolve between them. This page sets out how AI oversight holds or fails, the records that show it, and who holds each decision.

02پرسیارەکە

AI oversight and accountability: how the risk develops.

Roles, validation and human review. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

میکانیزم

Responsibility diffuses along the chain

A model developer, a fine-tuner, an integrator and a deploying organisation each shape a system’s behaviour. When obligations attach to only one of them, the others can point elsewhere after harm.

میکانیزم

Records decide what can be reviewed

Without technical documentation, logs and change records, auditors and regulators cannot reconstruct how a system reached an output. Record-keeping duties make later oversight possible.

میکانیزم

Authorities lack capacity

Market surveillance, data protection and sector regulators need technical staff, access to systems and powers to test them. Thin capacity turns rules into self-assessment.

میکانیزم

Incidents go unreported

Failures surface through complaints, journalism and litigation rather than reporting. Mandatory incident reporting and shared incident databases let patterns be seen across deployments.

03چاودێری

تۆماری گشتیی ئەلگۆریتمەکان.

ئەو شاشەیەی تیمێک بۆ بەدواداچوونی ئەم بابەتە بەکاری دەهێنێت: پێوەر، دۆخ و بڕیارەکانی. ناوەکان نموونەن و بەهاکان ڕوونکەرەوەن.

تۆماری گشتیی ئەلگۆریتمەکان

AI oversight and accountability · Algorithm register · Quarter 2

دوو سیستەمی مەترسیی بەرز بێ هەڵسەنگاندنGRF · زیرەکی دەستکرد و حوکمڕانیی دیجیتاڵ

سیستەمە تۆمارکراوەکان

نیشانەکردنی فێڵی سوودەکانتوانای کردەیی کۆمەڵگەییبەرزونبووبەشێکی
ڕیزکردنی مۆڵەتەکانپلاندانانسنووردارتەواو بووبەڵێ
دانانی قوتابخانەپەروەردەبەرزتەواو بووبەڵێ
یاریدەدەری چاتئۆفیسی باجکەمترینتەواو بووn/a

کرداری چاودێری

سیستەم
نیشانەکردنی فێڵی سوودەکان
پێویست
هەڵسەنگاندنی کاریگەری، ڕێگای تانە
کۆتا ماوە
73 days
دەسەڵات
لایەنی چاودێری

سکاڵا لە بڕیارە خۆکارەکان

Public algorithm register: the screen’s structure, terms and states for AI oversight and accountability.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
04نیشاندەرەکان

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeناونیشان
Designated AI supervisory or market surveillance authorityyes or no, with legal basison changeNational legislation and notificationsئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان
Technical staff in AI-relevant authoritiesfull-time equivalentsannualAuthority annual reportsڕاپۆرتکراو
Serious incidents reported under AI rulescount by sectorannualPublic recordsئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان
Publicly recorded AI incidentscount by harm typemonthlyIncident databasesڕاپۆرتکراو
Enforcement actions concerning AI systemscount by authority and typeannualRegulator enforcement registersئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان
ISO/IEC 42001 certificates issuedcountannualCertification body recordsڕاپۆرتکراو
05سیناریۆ سیاسییەکان

بەراوردکردنی ئامرازەکان: یاسا، هاندەر و زانیاری.

سێ خێزانی ئامراز پێکەوە بەرامبەر بە هێڵی بنەڕەت، هەریەکەیان بە دواکەوتن و خێرایی پەسەندکردنی خۆیەوە، لەژێر ئەو ڕووپۆشکردن و پابەندبوونەی تۆ دیاری دەکەیت؛ قەبارەی کاریگەرییەکان بەهای فێرکارین کە دەبێت بە بەڵگە بگۆڕدرێن. سیناریۆ: گریمانەی ناودار دەربارەی داهاتوو، نەک پێشبینی.

کۆنترۆڵەکان

ڕەوتی بنەڕەتیی دەرئەنجامەکە
2.0% لە ساڵێکدا
ڕووپۆشی ئامرازەکە
70%
پابەندبوون بە یاسا
75%
قەبارەی کاریگەری، بەرامبەر بە بەهای فێرکاری
100%
ساڵەکانی داهاتوو
20 ساڵ

خوێندنەوەکان

گەورەترین کەمبوونەوە لە ئاسۆدا
ڕێکخستن
کەمبوونەوەی بەرامبەر بە هێڵی بنەڕەت
21%
ژمارە، ڕێگا و سەرچاوەکان
ساڵبنەڕەتڕێکخستنهاندەری ئابووریزانیاری و توانا
0100.099.598.899.1
1102.0101.2100.199.8
2104.0102.5101.199.9
3106.1103.5101.6100.0
4108.2103.7101.8100.7
5110.4103.2101.7102.1
6112.6102.0101.6103.9
7114.9100.4101.6105.9
8117.299.2102.1108.0
9119.598.6102.9110.1
10121.998.9104.2112.3
11124.399.7105.7114.5
12126.8101.1107.4116.8
13129.4102.7109.4119.2
14131.9104.5111.4121.6
15134.6106.5113.5124.0
16137.3108.5115.7126.5
17140.0110.7118.0129.0
18142.8112.9120.4131.6
19145.7115.1122.8134.2
20148.6117.4125.2136.9

ڕێگاکان

  1. Tools of government Hood (1983), The Tools of Government, Macmillan
  2. Carrots, sticks and sermons Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (1998), Transaction
  3. Diffusion of innovations Rogers (2003), Diffusion of Innovations, Free Press
  4. پەنجەی نادڵنیایی (مۆنتی کارلۆی پارامیتەر) Spiegelhalter, Pearson و Short (2011)، Visualising uncertainty about the future، Science 333
  5. هەستیاریی یەک-یەک (تۆرناد) Saltelli و ئەوانی دیکە (2008)، Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer، Wiley

داتا

The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page’s map can draw:

  • Borders Natural Earth
  • Cities Natural Earth
بەراوردکردنی ئامرازەکان: یاسا، هاندەر و زانیاری. مۆدێلێکی فێرکاریی نموونەییە: لەسەر ئەو بەهایانە کار دەکات کە کۆنترۆڵەکان دایدەنێن، نەک لەسەر داتای پێوراو. میتۆدەکان: Tools of government (Hood (1983), The Tools of Government, Macmillan); Carrots, sticks and sermons (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (1998), Transaction); Diffusion of innovations (Rogers (2003), Diffusion of Innovations, Free Press).
06سەرچاوەکان

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

سەرچاوەWhat it givesLicence class
OECD.AI Policy ObservatoryNational AI policies, governance bodies and the AI Incidents MonitorFree, OECD terms
AI Incident DatabaseCrowd-sourced records of harms involving AI systemsOpen, licence to check
European Data Protection Board and national authority decisionsDecisions on automated processing and AI-related complaintsPublic, EU and national reuse terms
Stanford AI Index ReportData on AI development, policy and incidentsFree to read, licence to check
Regulator annual reportsStaffing, priorities and enforcement of authorities supervising AIPublic records, terms per authority
07جێبەجێکردن

لە ڕاسپاردەوە تا هەڵسەنگاندن، بە پێی کۆڵەکە.

ئەو هەنگاوانەی ئامرازێک لە ڕاسپاردەوە تا هەڵسەنگاندن دەیگرێتەبەر، هەریەکەیان لەگەڵ ئەو کۆڵەکەیەی بەڕێوەی دەبات، و ئەو بڕیارانەی لای دەسەڵات دەمێننەوە. مۆدێلێکی فێرکارییە بە بەهای نموونەیی دیاریکراو، نەک پێشبینی.

  1. Mandate and problem framing Competent authority (outside the programme)
    A competent authority frames the problem and the mandate under its own rules. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009)
  2. Evidence and system model Foundry
    The system is modelled with its feedbacks, data and stated limits. OECD (2014), principle 2
  3. Options appraised with scenarios Foundry
    Instruments are compared under scenarios, with uncertainty shown. Hood (1983)
  4. Exercise with stakeholders Universe
    The options are tested in an exercise with those who would implement and bear them. OECD (2014), principle 3
  5. Standard or guidance drafted Nexus Standards
    What works is codified as a standard or guidance, open to comment. Nexus Standards process
  6. Decision by the authority Competent authority (outside the programme)
    The authority decides, outside the programme, with the evidence on record. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009)
  7. Capacity and training Risk Academy
    Those who implement are trained on the decided instrument and its data. Sendai Framework (2015), priority 2
  8. Monitoring and public report Reports
    Indicators are published with sources, limits and corrections. OECD (2014), principle 5
  9. Evaluation and revision Nexus Standards
    Results return to the standard and the model: the cycle closes. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009)

ڕێگاکان

  1. Policy cycle Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009), Studying Public Policy, Oxford University Press
  2. Governance of critical risks OECD (2014), Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Critical Risks
  3. Layered drawing of directed graphs Sugiyama, Tagawa and Toda (1981), IEEE SMC 11
لە ڕاسپاردەوە تا هەڵسەنگاندن، بە پێی کۆڵەکە: هەنگاوەکان وەک تۆمارکراون، هەریەکەیان لەگەڵ کۆڵەکەکەی؛ سەرچاوەکان وەک لەسەر هەر هەنگاوێک ناوبراون.
08بڕیارەکان

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

AI and Digital Governance prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

کێ بڕیار دەداتپرسیارەکەEvidence this page serves
LegislaturesWhich obligations attach to developers, deployers and providers of general-purpose modelsComparative regimes and evidence from incidents
Market surveillance and sector regulatorsWhich systems to inspect and what powers to useIncident records, risk categories and enforcement practice
Boards of deploying organisationsWho owns AI risk and what assurance they requireGovernance practice and management system standards
CourtsWho is responsible for harm caused with an AI systemRecords and expert evidence presented by parties; the page serves context only

Outputs this topic produces

  • Maps of accountability across the AI value chain for a given use
  • Comparative notes on AI supervisory authorities and their powers
  • Guide to AI incident reporting regimes and databases
  • Questions for boards and regulators on AI oversight
09ئامراز و پابەندبوونەکان

How AI oversight and accountability is governed: instruments, mandates and commitments.

ئامراز، ڕاسپاردە، لایەنە کارا و ڕێکخستنەکانی بەرپرسیارێتی کە سیاسەتمەدارێک، دیپلوماتێک یان دامەزراوەیەکی گەشەپێدان لەگەڵیان کار دەکات، بە ناوهێنانی ئەو ڕێکەوتنانەی دایاندەنێن. پێکهاتەکان چوارچێوە ناوبراوەکان دەگرنەبەر. هەر دۆخ یان پێشکەوتنێک کێشراوە نموونەییە، نەک تۆمار.

خولی بەرپرسیارێتی

How commitments on AI oversight and accountability are held to account, from commitment to correction.

  1. پابەندبوونحکومەتپابەندبوونێک بە ڕاسپاردە و بنەمایەکی یاساییەوە.
  2. پلاندامەزراوەی سەرکردەپلانێکی نیشتمانی بە خاوەن و قۆناغی سەرەکییەوە.
  3. سەرچاوەوەزارەتی داراییهێڵێکی بودجە یان دابینکردنی داراییی تۆمارکراو.
  4. جێبەجێکردندامەزراوەکان و ئیدارەی خۆجێییجێبەجێکردن بەرامبەر بە پلانەکە.
  5. ڕاپۆرتئۆفیسی ئامارنیشاندەرەکان بە پێناسەی ڕێککەوتوو ڕاپۆرت دەکرێن.
  6. پێداچوونەوەدەسەڵاتی یاسادانان، ئۆدیت، کۆمەڵگای مەدەنیپێداچوونەوەی سەربەخۆی ئەنجام و بۆشاییەکان.
  7. ڕاستحکومەتگۆڕانکارییەکان لە پلانەکەدا، بە هۆکارەوە بڵاو دەکرێنەوە.
A generic accountability cycle; the owner of each step follows the country’s own constitution and law.
چوارچێوەی سێندای بۆ کەمکردنەوەی مەترسیی کارەسات · UNDRRڕێکەوتننامەی پاریس · UNFCCCئەجێندای 2030 و ئامانجەکانی گەشەپێدانی بەردەوام · نەتەوە یەکگرتووەکانڕێساکانی تەندروستیی نێودەوڵەتی · WHO
10Core questions

What institutions ask about oversight.

  • Who in the institution owns the decision to deploy this system, and who answers if it causes harm?
  • Has the system been validated for this specific use and population, by someone independent of its developers?
  • Can the people reviewing its outputs genuinely disagree with it, or do they simply approve what it suggests?
  • How will performance be monitored once the system is in use, and what triggers suspension?
11Mechanisms

Why accountability erodes.

Accountability tends to dissolve gradually. Each actor in a long chain of developers, integrators, operators and managers can reasonably point to another as responsible, until no one is. Why now: human oversight duties are being written into law, including in the European Union AI Act (2024), and public bodies must show who can understand and override an automated output. The platform is designed to convene those bodies and to exercise oversight in Universe with a scenario in which a system is confidently wrong.

Automation bias

Rubber-stamp review

People tend to defer to automated outputs, especially under time pressure, so human review can become a formality.

Diffusion

Many hands

Developers, vendors, integrators and users each own part of the system and none owns the outcome.

Drift

Changing performance

Models degrade as the world changes, and without monitoring the degradation goes unnoticed.

12Methods and limits

Instruments of oversight.

  1. 01

    Impact assessments

    Structured analysis of risks to rights and outcomes before deployment. Limits: can become paperwork if not tied to decisions.

  2. 02

    Independent validation

    Testing by people independent of developers, using AI evaluation and assurance engineering. Limits: tests show performance on test data, not in every real situation.

  3. 03

    Meaningful human review

    Reviewers with the authority, time, information and training to override. Limits: costly, and hard to sustain at scale.

  4. 04

    Audit trails and monitoring

    Logs of inputs, outputs and decisions, with performance tracked over time. Limits: only useful if someone reviews them.

13ڕێگاکان

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. AI evaluation and assurance engineeringThird-party audit scope · Fairness testing in public systems · Post-deployment monitoringApplied here
  2. Policy, institutional and decision scienceComparing AI regimes · Value chain accountability mapping · Forum and mandate mappingApplied here
  3. Artificial intelligence and machine learningHow models fail in deployment · Reading model documentation · Agent architectures explainedApplied here
14پرسیارەکان

پرسیار و وەڵام.

What is the difference between an AI provider and a deployer?
In the EU AI Act, a provider develops an AI system or model and places it on the market; a deployer uses it under its authority. Each carries different obligations.
Why does logging matter for AI oversight?
Logs and documentation let auditors, regulators and courts reconstruct how a system behaved. Without them, accountability depends on what the operator chooses to disclose.
Does ISO/IEC 42001 certify that an AI system is safe?
No. It certifies that an organisation runs a management system for AI meeting the standard’s requirements. The safety of a particular system needs its own evaluation.
Is having a human in the loop enough?
Not by itself. Review is meaningful only if the reviewer has the authority, time, information and competence to disagree with the system and does so when warranted.
Who should validate an AI system?
Someone independent of those who developed or sold it, with access to relevant data and the expertise to test it for the intended use.
Does the platform audit AI systems?
No. It compares governance practices and does not test or certify any system.
What should trigger suspending a system?
Institutions set their own triggers, typically including evidence of error rates above an agreed level, unexplained shifts in outputs or credible complaints of harm.
ڕاپۆرتەکانبەشداربە

لەم لاپەڕەیەوە بەڵگە پێشکەش بکە.

Reports بڵاوکراوەی وەرزیی کۆنسۆرتیۆم ـە. ئەوەی تۆ لەسەر ئەم بابەتە دەیزانیت دەتوانێت لە وەشانی داهاتوودا ببێتە بەڵگە، کەیس یان ڕاستکردنەوە، بە ناوی خۆتەوە و لەژێر CC BY 4.0 بڵاو دەکرێتەوە کاتێک کاری خۆتە.

Global Risks ForumAI and Digital GovernanceExponential TechnologyEvidence Brief
زیرەکی دەستکرد و حوکمڕانی دیجیتاڵی

پرسیارێکی حوکمڕانی بهێنە بۆ فۆرومەکە.

زانیاری و پرسیار ئەمڕۆ کراوەن. پرسیارێک ژمارەی ئاماژەی پێدەدرێت و هەنگاوی دواتر دیاری دەکات؛ داواکاری، پارەدان، تەرخانکردنی کۆمپیوتەر و تۆمارکردن تەنیا کاتێک دەکرێنەوە کە تیم، مەرج و توانای پێداچوونەوەیان هەبێت.

یاسایی
پیشاندانی هەموو 18 بەڵگەنامە یاساییەکە

نەخشە، داتا و وێنەکانی ئەم ماڵپەڕە بۆ ناوەڕۆک و زانیاریی گشتی پیشان دراون. ئامۆژگاری، پێشبینی یان ئاگادارکردنەوە نین؛ سنوورەکانی زانیارییەکە لە ڕەتکردنەوەی بەرپرسیارێتی و ئاگاداریی داتادا دەستنیشان کراون.