Lenses and readings

The AI baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument.

9 min read0 figures6 tables33 notesNR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1AI is infrastructure, not only software
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Chip supply disruption under grid constraint
  8. 6Lenses and readings
    1. 6.1 Three lenses
    2. 6.2 Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
    3. 6.3 GCRI reading: the model card
    4. 6.4 Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 AI readiness pack
    5. 6.5 Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
    6. 6.6 Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

6.1Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people AI arrives as a tool at work, a change in a job or a new data centre nearby. The baseline asks that public debate weigh the physical and social footprint of AI, power, water, work and access, alongside its benefits.

LAB-007 · DEV-011 · ENE-002

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading AI as physical infrastructure with fast-rising, clustered demand for power and water, and a highly concentrated supply chain. Evidence is strongest for electricity use and adoption, and weakest for water, inference energy and agentic failures.

ENE-001 · MIN-005 · SAF-009 · SYS-012

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Investment is large and concentrated, supply risk sits in a few regions, and liability and insurance for AI are nascent. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

ADO-006 · MIN-005

NEXUS

Synthesis

AI is scaling faster than the infrastructure and institutions around it. The 2027 programme should measure the physical couplings, test the chip–grid pathway, and build incident evidence for agentic systems before they become critical.

SYS-012 · X-01 · X-04

6.2Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

Every model runs in a building on a grid in a basin. Treating AI as weightless software hides where its demands land: on particular substations, cooling systems and communities. Reading AI by location is the first step to managing it as infrastructure.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

AI has an address

Leading-edge chips are made in very few places, from minerals refined in very few places, and run in very few clouds. Each concentration is efficient; together they form a chain whose weakest link is a single region.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Concentration is the risk

Systems that act on their own will fail in ways that chat interfaces do not. Before agents become critical to finance, health or infrastructure, the world needs incident evidence about them, not only principles.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Agents need evidence

About 2.6 billion people are offline. If AI’s benefits reach only the connected, its risks will still reach everyone. Access, skills and language belong in every account of AI readiness.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Access is the first safeguard

6.3GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.4Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 AI readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.12027 AI readiness pack
ItemRegisterState at baselineFirst 2027 entry
E1AI risk state deltabaseline set by this editionchanges against the baseline
E2WEFH+B state deltafive global system readings setindicator updates and freshness
E3Agenda and Portfolio movementeight agenda items · six proposed objectsadmission decisions
E4Federation delivery registerCanada, Global and Water issuednational readiness chapters
E5Consortium capability registernational consortia formingfirst contributions
E6Leadership questions and challengesnone yetfirst challenge log
E7Foundry technical statenational environments preparedfirst federation cut
E8Publication candidatestwelve findings carried forwardPUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9Universe readinessone candidate missionadmission and role spine
E10Correction registernonefirst federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

  • Publish
  • Hold
  • Needs evidence
  • Restricted
  • Superseded

6.5Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments that shape AI development and use, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

  • IN FORCE
  • ADOPTED
  • ADOPTED · OPEN FOR SIGNATURE
  • PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
Table 6.2Standards and regulatory watch
InstrumentBodyScopeStatusRelevance
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, AI Act4EUEuropean UnionIN FORCE · PHASEDrisk-based obligations
Framework Convention on AI, CETS 22510Council of Europeopen to all statesOPEN FOR SIGNATUREhuman rights, rule of law
OECD AI Principles8OECDadherentsADOPTED · UPDATED 2024trustworthy AI
UNESCO Recommendation9UNESCOglobalADOPTED 2021ethics
Global Digital Compact11UN General AssemblyglobalADOPTED 2024digital cooperation
UN scientific panel and dialogue12UN General AssemblyglobalESTABLISHED 2025evidence and dialogue
NIST AI RMF and GenAI profile56NISTvoluntaryPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYrisk management
ISO/IEC 420017ISO · IECinternationalPUBLISHEDmanagement systems
Hiroshima Code of Conduct30G7voluntaryPUBLISHED 2023advanced AI developers

Changed since 2024

  • EU AI Act prohibitions and general-purpose model rules began to apply4
  • The UN created an AI scientific panel and global dialogue12
  • The Council of Europe convention opened for signature10

To watch in 2027

  • Application of high-risk obligations under the AI Act4
  • First outputs of the UN scientific panel12
  • Ratifications of the Council of Europe convention10

6.6Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers water assessments, peer-reviewed hydrology and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

Question
What does the published evidence establish about AI as infrastructure and its couplings?
Sources searched
energy and compute analyses; safety assessments; labour studies; governance instruments; peer-reviewed research and labelled preprints
Window
releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
Selection
sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
Next step
systematic reviews for agenda items X-01 to X-05 in 2027
Table 6.3Peer-reviewed science and assessments
ReferenceTypeYearRoleUsed for
Bengio (ed.)3assessment2025supportsrisks of advanced AI
Sevilla and Roldán14research note2024supportscompute growth
Strubell et al.23proceedings2019contexttraining energy
Patterson et al.24preprint2021contexttraining emissions
Li et al.25preprint2023contextwater footprint
Bommasani et al.26preprint2021frameworkfoundation models
Cazzaniga et al.16staff note2024supportslabour exposure
Table 6.4Institutional flagships
ReferenceIssuerYearRoleUsed for
Energy and AI1IEA2025supportselectricity demand
AI Index 20252Stanford HAI2025supportsadoption, cost, incidents
Data-centre energy report15LBNL2024supportsUS electricity share
Governing AI for Humanity31UN advisory body2024contextglobal governance
Table 6.5Statistics, labour and access
ReferenceIssuerYearRoleUsed for
Generative AI and jobs32ILO2025supportsexposure
Future of Jobs20WEF2025supportsjob churn
Facts and Figures34ITU2024supportspeople offline
Technology and Innovation Report33UNCTAD2025contextdevelopment
Global Cybersecurity Outlook21WEF2025contextcyber
Table 6.6Supply chains, incidents and electricity
ReferenceIssuerYearRoleUsed for
Semiconductor supply chain17SIA · BCG2021supportschip concentration
Critical Minerals Outlook18IEA2025supportsmineral refining
Export controls1929MOFCOM · BIS2022–23supportstrade controls
AI Incident Database27Responsible AI Collaborative2026supportsincidents
AI Incidents Monitor28OECD2026supportsincidents
Global Electricity Review22Ember2025contextpower mix

Where the evidence agrees

  • Data-centre electricity demand is rising fast115
  • Compute and adoption are scaling quickly214
  • Chip supply is highly concentrated17

Where it is unsettled

  • How large inference demand will become as agents spread1
  • Whether AI will mainly augment or substitute work1632
  • How much water AI uses at global scale25

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 4European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal L, 12 July 2024, as amended.back
  2. 10Council of Europe (ed.), Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, CETS No. 225. Council of Europe, Vilnius, 2024.back
  3. 8OECD (ed.), Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence, OECD/LEGAL/0449, as amended in 2024. OECD, Paris, 2024.back
  4. 9UNESCO (ed.), Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. UNESCO, Paris, 2021.back
  5. 11United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Pact for the Future, resolution 79/1, annex I: Global Digital Compact. United Nations, New York, 2024.back
  6. 12United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution establishing the Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence and the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance. United Nations, New York, August 2025.back
  7. 5NIST (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), NIST AI 100-1. NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, 2023.back
  8. 6NIST (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile, NIST AI 600-1. NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, 2024.back
  9. 7ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 42001:2023, Information technology, Artificial intelligence, Management system. ISO, Geneva, 2023.back
  10. 30G7 Hiroshima AI Process (ed.), Hiroshima Process International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems. G7, Hiroshima, 2023.back
  11. 3Y. Bengio (ed.), International AI Safety Report. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, London, January 2025.back
  12. 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024.back
  13. 23E. Strubell, A. Ganesh and A. McCallum, “Energy and policy considerations for deep learning in NLP,” in Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pp. 3645–3650, 2019.back
  14. 24D. Patterson, J. Gonzalez, Q. Le et al., “Carbon emissions and large neural network training,” arXiv:2104.10350 (preprint, not peer-reviewed), 2021.back
  15. 25P. Li, J. Yang, M. A. Islam and S. Ren, “Making AI less ‘thirsty’: uncovering and addressing the secret water footprint of AI models,” arXiv:2304.03271 (preprint), 2023.back
  16. 26R. Bommasani, D. A. Hudson, E. Adeli et al., “On the opportunities and risks of foundation models,” arXiv:2108.07258 (preprint), 2021.back
  17. 16M. Cazzaniga, F. Jaumotte, L. Li et al., “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2024/001. IMF, Washington, DC, 2024.back
  18. 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
  19. 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025.back
  20. 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
  21. 31UN High-level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Governing AI for Humanity: Final Report. United Nations, New York, September 2024.back
  22. 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025.back
  23. 20World Economic Forum (ed.), Future of Jobs Report 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
  24. 34ITU (ed.), Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2024. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 2024.back
  25. 33UNCTAD (ed.), Technology and Innovation Report 2025: Inclusive Artificial Intelligence for Development. UNCTAD, Geneva, 2025.back
  26. 21World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
  27. 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021.back
  28. 18International Energy Agency (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
  29. 19Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (ed.), Announcement on implementing export control on gallium- and germanium-related items. MOFCOM, Beijing, July 2023.back
  30. 29U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), Implementation of additional export controls: certain advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items. Federal Register, October 2022, as updated.back
  31. 27Responsible AI Collaborative (ed.), AI Incident Database. incidentdatabase.ai, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
  32. 28OECD (ed.), OECD AI Incidents and Hazards Monitor. OECD.AI, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
  33. 22Ember (ed.), Global Electricity Review 2025. Ember, London, 2025.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 6: Lenses and readings. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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